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ARTISTIC CONTROL AFTER DEATH
Eva E. Subotnik *
Abstract: To what extent should authors be able to control what happens to their literary,
artistic, and musical creations after they die? Viewed through the lens of a number of
succession law trends, the evidence might suggest that strong control is warranted. The
decline of the Rule Against Perpetuities and rise of incentive trusts reflect a tightening grip of
the dead hand. And yet, an unconstrained ability of the dead to determine future uses of
literature, art, and music is a fundamentally troubling notion. This Article evaluates the
instructions authors give with respect to their authorial works against the backdrop of the
laws and policies that govern bequests more generally. In particular, it considers the
enforceability of attempted artistic control through the imposition of a fiduciary duty. In
balancing the competing interests, this Article considers the demands of both state trust laws
and federal copyright policy. In the end, this Article argues that authorial instructions must
yield to the needs of the living. Such a view requires that, to the greatest extent possible,
some living person(s) be authorized to decide how works of authorship are used—even if that
means overriding artistic control by the dead.
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INTRODUCTION
“So what’cha what’cha what’cha want, what’cha want?” 1 In 2014,
what Monster Energy Company wanted was to limit its damages for
using Beastie Boys songs in its “Ruckus in the Rockies” promotional
video. 2 That was not, apparently, what the jury wanted, for it awarded
the hip-hop group $1.2 million in damages. 3 An interesting, if not
dispositive, aspect of the litigation was what deceased Beastie Boy
Adam “MCA” Yauch wanted. Yauch, who had died from cancer in 2012
at the age of forty-seven, 4 prescribed in his will that “[n]otwithstanding
anything to the contrary, in no event may my image or name or any
music or any artistic property created by me be used for advertising

1. BEASTIE BOYS, SO WHAT’CHA WANT (Capitol Records 1992).
2. See Beastie Boys v. Monster Energy Co., 66 F. Supp. 3d 424, 427–28 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
3. Id. at 435.
4. RJ Cubarrubia, Adam Yauch’s Will Prohibits Use of His Music in Ads, ROLLING STONE (Aug.
9, 2012), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/adam-yauchs-will-prohibits-use-of-his-music-inads-20120809 [https://perma.cc/SX94-WA4B]; Beastie Boys Co-Founder Adam Yauch Dead at 47,
ROLLING STONE (May 4, 2012), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/beastie-boys-co-founderadam-yauch-dead-at-48-20120504 [https://perma.cc/7LH4-CRGV].
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purposes.” 5 Underscoring their apparent importance to him, Yauch had
actually penned the italicized words onto the face of his will. 6
At the time the will was offered for probate, commentators identified
several complexities raised by this provision, such as its application to
works that were jointly owned and the scope of the words “advertising
purposes.” 7 Indeed, the court in the Monster Energy trial excluded the
will from evidence essentially on these grounds and also out of concern
that the admission of such a spectral statement might sway the emotions
of the jury. 8 But even unmoored from the context of that litigation, the
Yauch will constitutes a bold dead-hand maneuver—an attempt to direct
the exploitation of copyright interests from beyond the grave. It is not
clear, however, that society should countenance such an attempt.
In order to appreciate why one might be skeptical of such an attempt,
it is first necessary to take a step back. The very nature of culture as an
amalgam of art, music, literature, and numerous other inputs that should
be permitted to develop freely has great appeal. It is for this reason that
many commentators criticize the current regime of intellectual property
rights. 9 They see these rights as artificially hamstringing the ability of
cultural participants to engage fully with the world—to the detriment of
society and future generations. 10 Some have even labeled intellectual

5. Will of Adam Yauch, at 8, ¶ 6 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. June 6, 2001) (emphasis added).
6. Id. For a photographic copy of this portion of Yauch’s will, see infra at section I.D. Yauch’s
words were also invoked in another contemporaneous litigation. See Jon Blistein, Beastie Boys
Settle Lawsuit over ‘Girls’ Toy Commercial, ROLLING STONE (Mar. 18, 2014),
http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/beastie-boys-settle-lawsuit-over-girls-toy-commercial20140318 [https://perma.cc/942G-S8X7] (discussing lawsuit over GoldieBlox’s use of Beastie Boys
song in ad).
7. E.g., Wendy S. Goffe, Part of Beastie Boy Adam Yauch’s Will, Banning Use of Music in Ads,
May Not Be Valid, FORBES (Aug. 13, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/deborahljacobs/2012/
08/13/part-of-beastie-boy-adam-yauchs-will-banning-use-of-music-in-ads-may-not-be-valid/
[perma.cc/SUF3-DAKD].
8. Transcript of Trial at 411–13, Beastie Boys v. Monster Energy Co., 66 F. Supp. 3d 424, 427–
28 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (No. 12 Civ. 6065) (excluding the will under Federal Rule of Evidence 403).
9. See, e.g., Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, The Freedom to Copy: Copyright, Creation, and Context,
41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 477, 521–22 (2007) (arguing that “the role of copying in the creative
process” is not sufficiently appreciated in legal, “author-centric conceptions” of creation).
10. Cf. id. at 480 (“[C]opyright doctrine does not adequately accommodate the varied ways in
which many artists actually create works.”). Importantly, such rights affect not only uses that
directly compete with the initial creator, but also adaptive and scholarly uses that seek merely to
build upon earlier works or to chronicle social developments. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.
§ 106(2) (2012) (setting forth the derivative work right under copyright law).
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property rights holders as “stewards” of culture, in addition to being
“owners,” 11 because of their vast power as cultural gatekeepers.
As the initial stewards of their own work, authors do not always make
farsighted decisions. 12 Irving Berlin was wildly successful in harnessing
the financial power of the copyright system. 13 But Berlin was
shortsighted in refusing to permit his music to be quoted in a seminal
treatment of the relevant musical form. 14 Specifically, Alec Wilder, in
his comprehensive analysis of American popular song, was able to
obtain most of the permissions he needed. 15 But his book will forever
contain a glaring gap for readers and scholars with respect to Berlin’s
works. 16
Scholars and other commentators have likewise documented
decisions by authors’ successors that appear out of step with the public
interest. 17 For example, James Joyce’s successor-in-interest, his
grandson, has become persona non grata in many circles for his stringent
management of Joyce’s copyrights. 18 President Warren G. Harding’s
successors also clamped down on the scholarly use—forty years after his

11. See, e.g., Shubha Ghosh, Managing the Intellectual Property Sprawl, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
979, 1007 (2012) (arguing that intellectual property owners “are just stewards for a broader class of
users, . . . [including] consumers, future generations, and constituents that rely on property but may
not have not [sic] a direct ownership stake”); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Author as Steward
“For Limited Times,” 88 B.U. L. REV. 685, 704 (2008) (reviewing LIOR ZEMER, THE IDEA OF
AUTHORSHIP IN COPYRIGHT (2007)) (underscoring that “copyright ownership involves duties to the
public as well as rights in the work”).
12. For an arguable example, see Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987)
(pursuing copyright claims against biographer’s use of unpublished letters).
13. See generally Copyright Term, Film Labeling, and Film Preservation Legislation: Hearings
on H.R. 989, H.R. 1248, and H.R. 1734 Before the Subcomm. on Courts & Intellectual Prop. of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 272 (1995) (prepared statement of Mary Ellin Barrett,
daughter of Irving Berlin) (arguing in favor of copyright term extension).
14. See ALEC WILDER, AMERICAN POPULAR SONG: THE GREAT INNOVATORS, 1900–1950, at 91
(James T. Maher ed., 1990).
15. See generally id. However, in at least one unsuccessful instance, an unnamed composer
actually pleaded with the rights-holding publisher on Wilder’s behalf, to no avail. Id.
16. Id. at 91; cf. Book Note, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1518, 1518 (1981) (reviewing FAIR USE AND FREE
INQUIRY: COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE NEW MEDIA (John Shelton Lawrence & Bernard Timberg eds.,
1980)) (placing some of the responsibility on “the scholar’s own publisher, who would insist that he
obtain (and pay for) permission from the copyright owner”).
17. E.g., RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW: THE RISING POWER OF THE AMERICAN
DEAD 144–47 (2010); Deven R. Desai, The Life and Death of Copyright, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 219,
258–59; Robert Spoo, Ezra Pound’s Copyright Statute: Perpetual Rights and the Problem of Heirs,
56 UCLA L. REV. 1775, 1822–27 (2009); Eva E. Subotnik, Copyright and the Living Dead?:
Succession Law and the Postmortem Term, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 77, 123–24 (2015).
18. E.g., MADOFF, supra note 17, at 144–46; Desai, supra note 17, at 258–59; Spoo, supra note
17, at 1825–27; Subotnik, supra note 17, at 123.
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death—of Harding’s love letters to his paramour that might have
revealed her German allegiances during World War I. 19
Such control by authors and other rights holders is tolerated—albeit
with resistance 20—because the compensating benefits are deemed worth
it. Those benefits primarily consist of upfront incentives to create
expressive works in the first place. But a fundamentally different
calculus is raised by attempts, such as by Yauch, to control the uses of
works after one’s death. To begin with, in many instances, valuable
works are jointly owned. This means that other individuals or entities
may have legal rights in the works. 21 Nevertheless, when the court asked
the Beastie Boys’ counsel whether Yauch’s will could block the living
co-owners’ rights to license the group’s music in advertising, counsel
responded, “I believe it can.” 22 This response, perhaps tendered in an
off-handed fashion, cannot be right as a matter of law. There is no
reason why a deceased co-owner would have more power to control
exploitation than he did while alive.
Even where joint ownership is not an issue, however, there are
significant reasons to be wary of permitting a deceased author to dictate
how his successors can use the materials that he created—and, a fortiori,
of permitting successive owners to so dictate. While attempted restraints
on advertising uses might not tug at the heartstrings with respect to our
cultural policies, they may cause significant hardships for an author’s
beneficiaries. Moreover, given the special and undeniable interest

19. Jordan Michael Smith, The Letters That Warren G. Harding’s Family Didn’t Want You to
See, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (July 7, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/ 2014/07/13/magazine/letterswarren-g-harding.html [https://perma.cc/J8K8-3NL4] (describing successful lawsuit by Harding
family in 1964 to prevent biographer Francis Russell from using the letters). “The Harding family
feared that publishing them would further tarnish Harding’s legacy and hurt the entire family. To
the dismay of many historians, a settlement was reached in which the Harding family, who owned
the copyright to the letters, agreed to donate them to the Library of Congress in return for a
guarantee that they remain sealed for 50 years.” Id.; see also JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH
A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS IN CULTURAL TREASURES 135–38 (1999); Jennifer
Schuessler, Warren G. Harding’s Racy Love Letters Unsealed, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2014),
http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/07/29/warren-g-hardings-racy-love-letters-unsealed/?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/ 27PM-R7T7].
20. See, e.g., Spoo, supra note 17, at 1828 (noting the “simple intuition” that “[h]eirs (and even
authors) might not be the best stewards of literary legacies”).
21. See, e.g., 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 5:7 (2015) (footnotes omitted) (“As
a co-owner in the whole, each joint author may utilize the work him- or herself without the other’s
permission and indeed over the other author’s objection.”).
22. Transcript of Trial at 403, Beastie Boys v. Monster Energy Co., 66 F. Supp. 3d 424 (S.D.N.Y.
2014) (No. 12 Civ. 6065).
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society may have in these assets, 23 other restrictions, like bans on
quotations or adaptations, or the ordered destruction of works, might
cause significant social harm. If enforced, these control mechanisms
mean that the public has to contend not only with a long postmortem
copyright term but also with circumstances in which uses of copyrighted
works are foreclosed—even if no living right holder objects.
Furthermore, as authors become increasingly savvy about their
intellectual property holdings, there is reason to suppose that this sort of
attempted control will become more routine.
Viewed through the lens of general succession law trends, the
evidence might suggest that strong control is warranted. 24 The
weakening of the Rule Against Perpetuities, the emergence of incentive
trusts, and the continued availability of conditional bequests and
honorary trusts all portray a dead hand whose clasp is growing ever
tighter. 25 At the same time, other trends in trust modification and
termination law bespeak increasing protectiveness of the interests of
living successors. 26 And courts have long refused to enforce
testamentary provisions that are capricious or socially harmful. 27
This Article makes two principal points. First, it argues that cloaking
authorial instructions in the garb of a fiduciary duty should by no means
guarantee their enforceability. Second, it argues that the enforceability of
such instructions should be guided by federal copyright policy. That
policy, while favoring postmortem copyrights, nevertheless should be
interpreted to disfavor attempts to strip living successors—including fair
users—of the power to make autonomous decisions about copyrighted
works. 28 To the contrary, as will be demonstrated, federal copyright
policy militates in favor of ensuring, to the greatest extent possible, that
at least one living person be in a position to make decisions about works
still under copyright—even if that means overriding the author’s
wishes. 29

23. E.g., SAX, supra note 19, at 46–47, 100–01; Desai, supra note 17, at 262–68; Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz, The Right To Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781, 813, 832 (2005).
24. See, e.g., Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621,
640 (2004) (“[U]nder the American approach . . . the donor’s intent controls.”). Throughout this
Article, I refer to donors as testators or settlors, depending on the context. The fundamental regard
for the donative intent of each is an established principle of American succession law.
25. See infra section II.C.
26. See infra section II.C.
27. See, e.g., infra note 135 and accompanying text.
28. See infra note 355 and accompanying text.
29. See infra section III.C.
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This Article proceeds as follows. Part I outlines the various means by
which authors communicate their wishes for the works they have
created. Part II situates postmortem artistic control within the types of
control decedents seek to exert more generally. It considers the policy
justifications for—and for interfering with—dead-hand control in other
contexts. Part III applies the lessons from that general exploration to the
artistic realm and balances the interests involved, arguing why certain
kinds of artistic instructions should or should not be enforced. 30 It
concludes that, to comport with federal copyright policy, aggressive
authorial instructions must yield to the needs of the living to the
maximum extent possible. This is particularly true where authors seek to
bar entire categories of uses of their works and where, on balance,
enforcement is likely not needed to protect against the premature
destruction of the work by the author. As one distinguished commentator
aptly stated, “In the end, death is the determining factor: death means the
final abdication of power. No matter what we wish, in dying we
relinquish control over ourselves and our work.” 31
I.

MEANS OF EXERTING ARTISTIC CONTROL AFTER DEATH

Considering the circumstances, dead authors are a prolific group.
While the creation of new works of authorship is clearly foreclosed after
death, previously authored works often come to light, or are re-packaged
in different ways, after authors die. On the one hand, many unknown
artists gain widespread public attention only following their deaths.32
For example, the enormously influential play Woyzeck, written by the
German dramatist Georg Büchner in the mid-1830s, stayed in relative
obscurity for almost eighty years following Büchner’s death at a young
30. Admittedly, I leave for another day an examination of the estate tax implications of the
analysis and proposal I offer in this Article.
31. Roxana Robinson, Burn Your Letters?, NEW YORKER: PAGE-TURNER (May 22, 2013),
http://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/burn-your-letters
[https://perma.cc/2QY8-S7NQ]
(“Maybe the real question is not, ‘Should we restrict our letters after we die?’ but ‘Should we sit
down at this desk and start making sentences?’ That’s the biggest risk.”). Robinson is the current
president of the Authors Guild. See Board of Directors, AUTHORS GUILD, https://www.
authorsguild.org/who-we-are/board-directors/ [https://perma.cc/82G9-HMNL].
32. See, e.g., Randy Kennedy, The Heir’s Not Apparent: A Legal Battle Over Vivian Maier’s
Work, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/06/arts/design/a-legal-battleover-vivian-maiers-work.html [https://perma.cc/FY8Q-JTX4] (describing posthumous rise to
prominence of street photographer Vivian Maier); John Williams, Lucia Berlin’s Roving, Rowdy
Life Is Reflected in a Book of Her Stories, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2015), http://www.
nytimes.com/2015/08/17/books/lucia-berlins-roving-rowdy-life-is-reflected-in-a-book-of-her-stories
.html [https://perma.cc/9E67-A9WN] (describing posthumous rise to prominence of writer Lucia
Berlin).
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age until its first staging in 1913. 33 On the other hand, recent years have
seen the posthumous publication of works by American luminaries like
Laura Ingalls Wilder, 34 Ernest Hemingway, 35 and Theodor Seuss
Geisel, 36 whose talents were appreciated during their own lifetimes. 37
The choices about how and when to edit and publish these works are
left in the hands of the living—either transferees of these rights during
the author’s lifetime or her at-death successors. 38 This is because, to
state the obvious, authors largely are not in a position to control their
works or their reputations after they die. Nevertheless, certain authors
attempt to influence, if not outright control, the treatment of their works
after their deaths. 39 This Part surveys the ways authors seek to exert such
control, which are not mutually exclusive.

33. Robert Scanlan, Coiled Razor Wire and Shards of Glass, AMERICAN REPARATORY THEATER,
http://americanrepertorytheater.org/inside/articles/coiled-razor-wire-and-shards-glass
[https://perma.cc/GNZ8-BGS9].
(Nov.
7
2014),
34. Ruth
Graham,
Those
Happy
Golden
Years,
SLATE
http://www.slate.com/articles/arts/books/2014/11/little_house_nonfiction_laura_ingalls_wilder_s_m
emoir_pioneer_girl_reviewed.html [https://perma.cc/3NNS-NB27] (reviewing Pioneer Girl,
Wilder’s “first-person, nonfictional account of 16 years of her childhood,” which was first published
about eighty-five years after Wilder wrote it).
35. Hemingway’s A Moveable Feast was first published posthumously in 1964. A much more
recent version, published in 2009, which caused great controversy over its revised portrayal of
Hemingway’s second wife, was edited by her grandson. See A. E. Hotchner, Don’t Touch ‘A
Moveable Feast,’ N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/20/opinion/
20hotchner.html [https://perma.cc/ J4VX-GJF3]; Motoko Rich, ‘Moveable Feast’ Is Recast by
Hemingway Grandson, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/28/books/
28hemingway.html [https://perma.cc/8WHZ-GPVE].
36. See discussion infra section I.B.
37. See R. Anthony Reese, Public but Private: Copyright’s New Unpublished Public Domain, 85
TEX. L. REV. 585, 597 (2007) (collecting other notable examples).
38. There is no doubt that some of those choices would make their associated authors blanch. See,
e.g., Claudia La Rocco, Review: ‘On Writing,’ a Charles Bukowski Collection of Rants and Musings
in Letters, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/10/books/review-onwriting-a-charles-bukowski-collection-of-rants-and-musings-in-letters.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/
W3RB-GYWL] (discussing the steady publication of books by Charles Bukowski following his
death in 1994). As La Rocco puts it, “It’s hard to imagine Bukowski putting much stock in the
choices made in his absence: ‘Writers have to put up with this editor thing; it is ageless and eternal
and wrong,’ he wrote.” Id.
39. Of course, not all creators seek to remain involved. Author Neil Gaiman said:
I love copyright—I love the fact that I can feed myself and feed my children with the stuff I
make up. On the other hand, copyright length right now is life plus 75 [sic] years, and I don’t
know that I want to be in control of what I’ve created for 75 years after I’ve died! I don’t know
that I want to be feeding my great-grandchildren. I feel like they should be able to look after
themselves, and not necessarily put limits on what I’ve created, if there’s something that would
do better in the cultural dialogue.
Neil Gaiman & Kazuo Ishiguro, “Let’s Talk About Genre”: Neil Gaiman and Kazuo Ishiguro in
Conversation, NEW STATESMAN (June 4 2015), http://www.newstatesman.com/2015/05/neil-
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Novelist Roxana Robinson offers three explanations for authors’
attempted restrictions on material:
[O]ne, that it’s private, and its release would violate the privacy
of someone still living. Another, that it would reveal behavior or
information that would embarrass the writer or her friends, and
invite disapprobation. A third, particularly important for a
writer, is that the work is unsuccessful or unfinished, unprepared
for scholarly scrutiny. 40
While it is often difficult, if not impossible, to know precisely why
any given author tries to control his or her works after death, the
examples that follow appear to reflect these and other reasons.
A.

Outright Testamentary Gifts

An author’s ability to control aspects of her post-death legacy derives
from her rights to control her tangible and intangible works. Tangible
materials, like unpublished manuscripts, canvases, or diaries, pass to her
successors as personal property. With respect to intangible copyright
interests, which now generally last for the life of the author plus seventy
years, 41 authors and subsequent owners may likewise transfer ownership
by will, trust, or intestate succession. 42
In many cases, an author’s specifications as to the future uses of her
tangible or intangible assets are manifested solely through the kinds of
dispositions she makes in her will. A specific gift of these interests may
suggest that the author was thinking particularly about who would
control them after her death. A residuary gift, by contrast, need not even
identify the interests. 43 This is because a residuary clause functions as a
catch-all bequest of every property interest not otherwise disposed of. 44

gaiman-kazuo-ishiguro-interview-literature-genre-machines-can-toil-they-can-t-imagine
[https://perma.cc/T2QF-6B4P]. Many thanks to Betsy Rosenblatt for this reference.
40. Robinson, supra note 31.
41. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012).
42. Id. § 201(d)(1) (“The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in part by any
means of conveyance or by operation of law, and may be bequeathed by will or pass as personal
property by the applicable laws of intestate succession.”).
43. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 374 (9th ed.
2013) (distinguishing among specific, general, and residuary gifts).
44. See id.; David S. Olson, First Amendment Interests and Copyright Accommodations, 50 B.C.
L. REV. 1393, 1412 (2009) (“Although the ownership of copyrights in valuable works by famous
authors is usually established at the time of death when other assets are divided, ownership of the
copyrights of more ordinary people is less likely to be determined upon death. Thus, such rights
likely pass with the residue of the estate.”).
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Residuary gifts can cause great mischief for this very reason: most
people may have a general sense of the balance of their property not
specifically devised in the earlier parts of a will. But they may have a
less concrete sense of the incorporeal assets, like intellectual property
rights, that will also be caught by and passed through a residuary
clause. 45 Thus, where an artist bequeaths a painting she painted (and to
which she retained copyright) to Beneficiary X, while making
Beneficiary Y her residuary beneficiary, Beneficiary X will own the
tangible work while Beneficiary Y will own the copyright in that work. 46
Both specific and residuary gifts of these interests can be seen as
expressive acts by the author-testator, 47 and indeed, they can instantiate
great power in their recipient. But such gifts are different in kind from
gifts that are intertwined with restrictions on how rights or works can be
exploited in the future. 48
B.

Leading by Example

Some authors die having expressed preferences through the examples
they set during their own lives. 49 Playwright and novelist Thornton
Wilder was not the kind who left instructions. 50 In their absence, his first
generation of successors—“those closest to the flame,” as his nephew
and literary executor Tappan Wilder put it—“typically and
understandably adopted the default position of continuing to honor, with
rare exceptions, the policies of the departed. Two examples of Thornton
Wilder’s policies that were largely followed: not publishing or

45. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Neil J. Rosini, Entm’t Lawyer, Franklin, Weinrib, Rudell
& Vassallo, P.C. (June 29, 2015) (on file with author) (Mr. Rosini is an entertainment lawyer
focusing on intellectual property matters).
46. See 17 U.S.C. § 202; Lee-ford Tritt, Liberating Estates Law from the Constraints of
Copyright, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 109, 143–44 (2006).
47. See David Horton, Testation and Speech, 101 GEO. L.J. 61, 85 (2012).
48. Id. at 64 n.17; accord Jeffrey G. Sherman, Posthumous Meddling: An Instrumentalist Theory
of Testamentary Restraints on Conjugal and Religious Choices, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1273, 1329
(1999) (favoring the ability of “property owners to designate their successors” but disfavoring their
“superintend[ence] [over] their successors’ behavior”); Subotnik, supra note 17, at 118–24
(highlighting this distinction and arguing that it is often imprecise to label outright testamentary
gifts of copyright interests as a species of dead-hand control).
49. Cf. Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 244 N.E.2d 250, 253, 256 (N.Y. 1968)
(putting great stock in Ernest Hemingway’s “words and conduct” during life in adjudicating state
common-law copyright claims).
50. Email from Tappan Wilder, Literary Ex’r and Managing Member, Wilder Family LLC, to
Eva E. Subotnik, Associate Professor of Law, St. John’s Univ. Sch. of Law (Feb. 17, 2017, 21:10
EST) (on file with author).
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performing excerpts of his works or allowing musical adaptations of key
dramas or stage adaptations of key novels.” 51
Another example is Theodor Seuss Geisel, the author of the Dr. Seuss
books, who left behind nearly complete drafts for a children’s book that
he never published during his lifetime. 52 After the drafts were discovered
in 2013, a Random House employee who had worked directly with
Geisel was charged with bringing the book to publication. 53 While
Geisel had not left explicit instructions—indeed, it is unknown why he
chose not to publish the book during his lifetime 54—the employee relied
on artistic choices made by Geisel while still alive. 55 These included
referencing instructions for coloring in works that Geisel gave when he
was too ill to work; piecing the text together by taping pages up on a
wall (as he was wont to do); consulting the works he had published
around the same time; and “follow[ing] his method of picking hues from
a chart . . . and marking up each page like a paint-by-numbers project.” 56
C.

Discussions with the Living

Still other authors attempt to exert some artistic control by having
discussions with their future successors or in ways that are operative
during their own lifetimes. For example, Edward Mendelson, literary
executor for the W. H. Auden estate, knew the poet in life. Before he
died, Auden said to him, “You must use your judgment” in making
decisions about licensing and publication. 57 Renowned children’s book
author Maurice Sendak opted for a similar approach with his executor
51. Id. The second-generation successors, by contrast, selectively permit these and other activities
to shed more light on the writer’s life and work. These later successors “care about the flame but are
not slaves to it.” Id.; see also Tappan Wilder, Thornton Wilder for the Twenty-First Century, in
THORNTON WILDER: NEW PERSPECTIVES 3, 4–6 (Jackson R. Bryer & Lincoln Konkle eds., 2013);
Telephone Interviews with Tappan Wilder, Literary Ex’r and Managing Member, Wilder Family
LLC (July 3, 2014 and July 15, 2014) (on file with author). I am very grateful to Tappan Wilder for
so generously and helpfully speaking with me on this topic.
52. Alexandra Alter, Dr. Seuss Book: Yes, They Found It in a Box, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/22/books/dr-seuss-book-a-discovery-in-a-box-and-then-areconstruction.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/XJB2-57RU].
53. Id.
54. Id.; see also Maria Russo, Dr. Seuss’ ‘What Pet Should I Get?’, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/26/books/review/dr-seuss-what-pet-should-i-get-review.html
[https://perma.cc/E5VV-Z4F2] (reviewing DR. SEUSS, WHAT PET SHOULD I GET? (2015)).
55. Alter, supra note 52.
56. Id.
57. See Interview with Edward Mendelson, Literary Ex’r for W. H. Auden, in New York, N.Y.
(May 15, 2014) (on file with author). I am very grateful to Edward Mendelson for the information
he provided to me in this regard.
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Lynn Caponera, his former housekeeper and caretaker. Sendak informed
Caponera that it would be her responsibility to pare down the belongings
in his house in order to transform it into a museum: 58
“He said, ‘Lynn, you’ll know what to keep and what not to,”’
said Ms. Caponera . . . . “And I thought, ‘Oh my God, I don’t
know, it’s too much.’ But he was right. I am very, very aware of
the things that meant the most to him.” 59
Taking a different tack, Kurt Vonnegut wrote letters that actually
attempted to ensure the free use of his works by the letters’ recipients.
Specifically, approximately ten years before his death, Vonnegut sent
one scholar of his work a letter granting him “unrestricted permission to
quote anything I ever said or wrote, at any length, and without notice or
compensation.” 60 The failure to obtain such a letter caused significant
problems for a biographer after Vonnegut’s death. 61
Institutional loyalties can sometimes be a driving force for authors.
Justice Hugo Black, not long before his death in 1971, instructed his
trusted secretary via memorandum that
I do not believe that my personal notes on and for Court
conferences should be left in the official files or made
public. . . . If you have any questions about what are conference
notes to be burned and what are not, . . . Hugo, Jr. will tell you
what to do, which is to destroy them all. 62
Justice Black expressed concern that publication of his papers would
both present a skewed historical record and impede free discussion
among the Justices. 63 While Justice Black, as he neared death, wanted
immediate action taken (and some was taken while he was still alive),

58. Sendak provided that his house in rural Connecticut was to be used as a study center and
museum. Will of Maurice Sendak, at 4–5, ¶ 5.B.1(b) (Feb. 6, 2011); id. at 5, ¶ 5.B.3(b); see also
Randy Kennedy, Sendak’s Estate: Debating Where the Things Go, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/02/books/maurice-sendaks-estate-debating-where-the-thingsgo.html [https://perma.cc/2HZ4-BRGL]. I thank Philip Nel for making Sendak’s will publicly
available. See Philip Nel, Maurice Sendak’s Will, NINE KINDS OF PIE: PHILIP NEL’S BLOG (June 10,
2015), http://www.philnel.com/2015/06/10/sendakwill/ [https://perma.cc/BZQ4-KYNS].
59. Kennedy, supra note 58.
60. Craig Fehrman, The Last Word, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 12, 2011), https://newrepublic
.com/article/96122/vonnegut-shields-and-so-it-goes-estate [https://perma.cc/CX4D-82C4] (internal
quotation marks omitted).
61. Id.
62. See SAX, supra note 19, at 100 (quoting TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, MR. JUSTICE BLACK AND
HIS CRITICS 303 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Justice Black had instructed his son
Hugo, Jr. similarly. Id.; see also HUGO BLACK, JR., MY FATHER: A REMEMBRANCE 250–55 (1975).
63. See SAX, supra note 19, at 100–02.
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his successors continued the destructive activity after his death in
accordance with his instructions. 64
In other instances, the destructive orders seem to reflect the author’s
view that the works are unfinished or imperfect or would in some way
compromise his hoped-for artistic legacy. Vladimir Nabokov, who died
in 1977, “left instructions . . . to burn the 138 handwritten index cards
that made up the rough draft of his final and unfinished novel, The
Original of Laura.” 65 Nabokov had been “feverishly” working on the
draft while terminally ill in a hospital in Lausanne.66 As things looked
increasingly grim, he “had a very serious conversation with his wife, in
which he impressed upon her that if Laura remained unfinished at his
death, it was to be burned.” 67 Nabokov’s wife did not adhere to these
instructions and, three decades later, his son decided that Nabokov, if
alive, would not oppose the work’s publication since it “had survived the
hum of time this long.” 68 (Of course, this was the case only because
Nabokov’s successors had failed to carry out his instructions.)
Nabokov’s son underscored that his father “did not desire to burn The
Original of Laura willy-nilly, but to live on . . . to finish at least a
complete draft.” 69
The poster child for such instructions is Franz Kafka. Kafka issued
both written and oral instructions to his close friend Max Brod to destroy
all of his unpublished writings, 70 which included the manuscripts of The
Trial, The Castle and Amerika—instructions that Brod did not follow. 71
Specifically, at his death, Kafka left behind two letters, one of which
instructed Brod as follows: “Everything I leave behind me . . . in the way
of diaries, manuscripts, letters (my own and others’), sketches, and so

64. Id. at 100–01. For a critique, see Kathryn A. Watts, Judges and Their Papers, 88 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1665, 1672 (2013) (“[J]udicial papers should be treated as governmental rather than private
property, just as presidential papers are.”).
65. The Original of Laura by Vladimir Nabokov, KNOPF DOUBLEDAY PUBLISHING GROUP,
http://knopfdoubleday.com/nabokov/ [https://perma.cc/AS3Y-LSHW].
66. Dmitri Nabokov, Introduction to VLADIMIR NABOKOV, THE ORIGINAL OF LAURA (DYING IS
FUN) xi, xvi (Dmitri Nabokov ed., 2013).
67. Id. at xvi–xvii.
68. Id. at xviii; see also Aleksandar Hemon, Hands Off Nabokov, SLATE (Nov. 10, 2009),
http://www.slate.com/articles/arts/books/2009/11/hands_off_nabokov.1.html [https://perma.cc/JG
4R-4BV8] (disapproving of the decision to publish the work).
69. Nabokov, supra note 66, at xvii.
70. See SAX, supra note 19, at 46.
71. See Strahilevitz, supra note 23, at 830–31; Nili Cohen, The Betrayed(?) Wills of Kafka and
Brod, 27 L. & LITERATURE 1, 12–13 (2015).
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on, to be burned unread.” 72 But Kafka and Brod had also had
conversations in which Brod informed Kafka that he could never bring
himself to adhere to Kafka’s verbally expressed requests in that regard.73
This has led to much speculation about what Kafka really wanted
because, knowing Brod’s response ahead of time, Kafka nevertheless
declined to leave the task to some other party. 74
Although Kafka had studied law, he did not, apparently, seek to
execute a legally binding will.75 Rather, as Nili Cohen points out, in
forgoing testamentary formalities, “it would appear that Kafka imposed
upon his friend a moral, not a legal, obligation.” 76 In that way, he
differed from the next group of authors.
D.

Specific Instructions in a Will or Trust

Exhibiting the most naked attempts to exert post-death control,
authors have included particular instructions in their testamentary
instruments—with varying levels of success. Authors sometimes try to
require their successors to consult with one another. Pulitzer Prize
winning poet James Merrill, who died in 1995, started by giving his
literary executors “full power and authority to edit . . . my literary
papers . . . and to make proper arrangements for publication . . . as they
may consider wise or expedient.” 77 Immediately after this broad grant,
however, Merrill provided that the literary executors “shall consult with
the head of the Department of Special Collections of the Olin Library
System of Washington University” presumably about these very same
matters. 78
72. LAW, LANGUAGE, AND ETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL METHOD 1–5
(William R. Bishin & Christopher D. Stone eds., 1972) (quoting Max Brod, Postscript to the First
Edition (1925) of FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL 326–35 (Modern Library ed. 1956)) [hereinafter
Bishin & Stone]; cf. Judith Butler, Who Owns Kafka?, 33 LONDON REV. BOOKS 3, 8 (Mar. 3, 2011),
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v33/n05/judith-butler/who-owns-kafka [https://perma.cc/AQ3V-YY5B] (“And
yet the letter [to Brod] makes a demand to destroy the writing, which would logically entail the
nullification of the letter itself, and so nullify even the command that it delivers.”).
73. See SAX, supra note 19, at 46; Cohen, supra note 71, at 7.
74. SAX, supra note 19, at 46–47; Cohen, supra note 71, at 7; see also Mary Sarah Bilder, The
Shrinking Back: The Law of Biography, 43 STAN. L. REV. 299, 330 (1991).
75. Cohen, supra note 71, at 4. But see Bishin & Stone, supra note 72, at 6 (suggesting that
Kafka’s instructions could have constituted a valid holographic will under the prevailing law).
76. Cohen, supra note 71, at 4.
77. Will of James I. Merrill, at 13, ¶ 19.A (Sept. 30, 1994). I am very grateful to J. D. McClatchy
and Stephen Yenser, co-literary executors for the James Merrill estate, for providing me with the
relevant provisions of Merrill’s will and with helpful background information about the Merrill
estate.
78. Id.
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Even that kind of innocuous-sounding instruction can lead to
litigation. Maurice Sendak, for example, named a “literary advisor” who
was to be consulted by his executors before making decisions about
certain literary matters, though he gave the executors ultimate say. 79
Sendak also stated that it was his “wish that the MAURICE SENDAK
FOUNDATION INC. make arrangements with THE ROSENBACH
MUSEUM AND LIBRARY for the display of” his artwork “upon such
terms and conditions and at such times as shall be determined by the
[Foundation] in consultation with [The Rosenbach].” 80 This provision
formed part of the basis of a lawsuit by the Rosenbach, which claimed
that the Foundation had failed to seek out or heed its input. 81
Beyond these arguably milder forms of attempted control, authors
have also sought to gain a more substantial reach. Perhaps reflecting a
desire for privacy, some instructions concern access to or destruction of
the author’s works. Merrill, for example, instructed the Department of
Special Collections “in its discretion [to] permit access . . . to my
notebooks and journals prepared subsequent to 1980 only after fifteen
(15) years from the date of my death.” 82 Sendak, in his will, “direct[ed]
my executors to destroy, immediately following my death, all of my
personal letters, journals and diaries.” 83
Lest one think—based on the foregoing discussion—that issuing such
instructions is the province solely of male authors, Willa Cather provides
a ready counterpart. 84 During life, she “took obsessive care over [her

79. Will of Maurice Sendak, at 11–12, ¶ 13.B (Feb. 6, 2011). These matters included the “sale or
licensing of any copyrights,” the “[a]rrangements and contracts for publication of [his] work,” the
“granting or withholding of permissions for the use of any of [his] work,” and the “preservation or
destruction of drafts of [his] drawings, illustrations and writings.” Id.
80. Id. at 5, ¶ 5.B.3(b).
81. See Peter Dobrin, Rosenbach Sues Sendak Foundation over Rare Books, PHILA. INQUIRER
(Nov. 10, 2014), http://articles.philly.com/2014-11-11/news/56395085_1_sendak-items-rosenbachmuseum-the-rosenbach [https://perma.cc/STF7-GEQ5]. The complaint also alleged that the estate
had not turned over the multimillion-dollar rare book collection that Sendak gave outright to the
Rosenbach in his will. Id. However, the litigation has apparently settled. See Peter Dobrin,
Settlement Reached in Rosenbach’s Maurice Sendak Lawsuit, PHILA. INQUIRER (Nov. 29, 2016),
http://www.philly.com/philly/columnists/peter_dobrin/Settlement-in-Sendak-lawsuit-.html
[https://perma.cc/STF7-GEQ5].
82. Will of James I. Merrill, at 13, ¶ 19.C (Sept. 30, 1994).
83. Will of Maurice Sendak, at 1, ¶ 2 (Feb. 6, 2011).
84. Another possible counterpart is Harper Lee. According to one journalist, Lee’s will banned
any additional film remakes of To Kill a Mockingbird. See Billy Heller, My Encounter with the
Reclusive Harper Lee, N.Y. POST (July 13, 2015), http://nypost.com/2015/07/13/my-encounterwith-the-reclusive-harper-lee/ [https://perma.cc/524N-5JBU]. It is not possible, however, to
substantiate the claim. See Jennifer Crossley Howard, Judge Seals Harper Lee’s Will From Public’s
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books’] presentation: quibbling with publishers over margin widths,
forbidding excerpts for anthologies and banning movie adaptations.” 85
This desire for control carried over into her will, in which she forbade
the publication of her letters and the adaptation of her works into other
media. 86 One scholar has “called Cather’s late-life obsession with
privacy an ‘enduring mystery,’” 87 but for a time it was speculated by
some that it reflected a desire to prevent the dissemination of
information about her sexuality. 88 The ban on adaptations may have
been based on her unhappiness with particular adaptations. 89
While Cather, “realizing the complexity and difficulty of dealing in
rights with respect to literary property,” gave great discretion to her
trustee in making the relevant decisions, that discretion applied only to
the exploitation of intellectual property rights that she had not
forbidden. 90 The most she would yield with respect to the proscribed
uses was in explicitly declining to charge her fiduciaries “with the duty
of bringing legal proceedings to restrain the unauthorized use[s]” and
Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/05/books/judge-sealsharper-lees-will-from-publics-scrutiny.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/WZ5Y-VGL3].
85. Jennifer Schuessler, O Revelations! Letters, Once Banned, Flesh Out Willa Cather, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/22/books/willa-cather-letters-to-bepublished-as-an-anthology.html [https://perma.cc/YT4B-9ZZD]; accord Andrew Jewell & Janis
Stout, Introduction to THE SELECTED LETTERS OF WILLA CATHER vii, viii (Andrew Jewell & Janis
Stout eds., 2013).
86. Willa Cather’s will provides:
I direct that my Executors and Trustee shall not lease, license or otherwise dispose of the
following rights in literary properties written by me, viz: dramatization, whether for the
purpose of spoken stage presentation or otherwise, motion picture, radio broadcasting,
television and rights of mechanical reproduction, whether by means now in existence or which
may hereafter be discovered or perfected; and I further direct that neither my Executors nor my
Trustee shall consent to, or permit, the publication in any form whatsoever, of the whole, or
any part of any letter or letters written by me in my lifetime, nor the use, exploitation or
disposal of any other right therein.
Will of Willa Cather, at 4–5, ¶ 7 (Apr. 29, 1943); see also Intellectual Property: The Willa Cather
Trust, WILLA CATHER FOUND., https://www.willacather.org/about/permissions/intellectual-property
[https://perma.cc/96MR-QE5K] [hereinafter Willa Cather Trust IP Policy] (discussing the terms of
Willa Cather’s will and the Willa Cather Trust’s intellectual property policy). I am very grateful to
Andrew Jewell for his explanation of how Willa Cather’s will has been construed over time.
87. Schuessler, supra note 85 (quoting Guy Reynolds, an English professor at the University of
Nebraska and board member of the Cather Foundation).
88. Id. More recently, other scholars have offered alternate interpretations. Janis Stout has argued
that the privacy provisions may have “had less to do with any sexual secrecy than with Cather’s
overwhelming depression” during the relevant period of time. Id. Stout and Jewell also suggest that
“Cather’s testamentary restriction on the publication of her letters . . . instead was an act consistent
with her long-held desire to shape her own public identity.” Jewell & Stout, supra note 85, at viii.
89. Schuessler, supra note 85 (“‘My decision about dramatization,’ [Cather] wrote after a
disappointing 1934 adaptation of ‘A Lost Lady,’ ‘is absolute and final.’”).
90. Will of Willa Cather, at 5, ¶ 9 (Apr. 29, 1943).
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instead “leav[ing] it to the sole and uncontrolled discretion of my
Executors and Trustee . . . whether to proceed by legal action to prevent
the exercise of any of such rights.” 91 This provided some leeway to
depart from her instructions.
Cather’s instructions were given effect for six decades to prevent even
scholarly quotation of her letters, leading to much paraphrasing—some
of it divergent from the original text.92 These prohibitions expired in
2011 upon the death of Cather’s nephew and second executor; at that
point, her copyrights passed to a new trust, the Willa Cather Trust,
which has taken a less stringent approach to uses of her works. 93 For
their part, the editors of a new anthology of Cather’s letters admit that
“in producing this book . . . we are defying Willa Cather’s stated
preference that her letters remain hidden from the public eye.” 94 But
publication, they argue, “will do nothing to damage her reputation” and
instead will “provide insights into her methods and artistic choices” and
reveal her to be “a complicated, funny, brilliant, flinty, sensitive,
sometimes confounding human being.” 95
As with Cather’s prohibition on adaptations, some instructions reflect
great concern over the form or context in which a work might appear—
perhaps on the basis of an author’s artistic vision. Tennessee Williams
“expressly direct[ed]” his fiduciaries, among other things, to uphold his
command that “no play which I shall have written . . . be changed in any
manner . . . except for the customary type of stage directions.” 96 Other
instructions reflect an aversion to the uses of one’s works for advertising
or other commercial purposes. As mentioned earlier, Adam Yauch’s will
provided that “[n]otwithstanding anything to the contrary, in no event
may my image or name or any music or any artistic property created by
me be used for advertising purposes.” 97 Such a deep-seated philosophy
on this issue is not unusual among musicians. Jim Morrison of The
91. Id. at 5, ¶ 7; see also Jewell & Stout, supra note 85, at ix.
92. Joan Acocella, What’s in Cather’s Letters, NEW YORKER: PAGE-TURNER (Apr. 9, 2013),
http://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/whats-in-cathers-letters
[https://perma.cc/W92N3H4M]; see also Hermione Lee, Willa Cather: A Hidden Voice, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (July 11, 2013),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2013/ 07/11/willa-cather-hidden-voice/ [https://perma.cc/W92N3H4M] (book review).
93. Schuessler, supra note 85; see also Willa Cather Trust IP Policy, supra note 86.
94. Jewell & Stout, supra note 85, at ix.
95. Id. at ix–x.
96. LUCY A. MARSH, PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF THE LAW: WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 18
(1998) (quoting Will of Tennessee Williams, at Article VIII). Many thanks to Thomas Simmons for
pointing me to this source.
97. Will of Adam Yauch, at 8, ¶ 6 (N.Y. Surr. Ct.) (June 6, 2001) (emphasis added).
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Doors expressed outrage over a deal in the works that would have
resulted in an ad to the effect of “Come On Buick, Light My Fire.” 98 It
was, in part, an attempt to preserve Morrison’s artistic legacy on this
front that prompted his bandmate John Densmore to put the kibosh on
plans to use The Doors’ music for a Cadillac commercial—a deal worth
fifteen million dollars—many years later after Morrison’s death. 99

98. JOHN DENSMORE, THE DOORS: UNHINGED: JIM MORRISON’S LEGACY GOES ON TRIAL xiii–
xv, 68–69 (2013).
99. Id. at 9–11, 28, 80. For an account of the agreements, and the disputes, among the bandmates,
see Geoffrey R. Scott, What Do Jim Morrison, Kurt Cobain, Elvis Presley, and Utagawa Toyoharu
Have in Common? Protecting Artistic Legacy in the United States and Japan: A Comparison of U.S.
Legal Principles and Iemoto Seido of Japan, 26 CONN. J. INT’L L. 161, 168–80 (2010).
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Figure 1:
Relevant Page from Adam Yauch’s Will 100

Political concerns seem to drive yet others. The Austrian writer
Thomas Bernhard had a deeply complicated relationship with his
homeland, including its “legacy of guilt and liabilities as well as a proud
100. As a courtesy, I have redacted the names and addresses of the three witnesses.
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tradition of cultural achievement.” 101 Bernhard apparently saw in death
an opportunity to achieve his “posthumous literary emigration.” 102 His
will provided:
[N]othing I published during my lifetime, or any of my papers
wherever they may be after my death, or anything I wrote in
whatever form, shall be produced, printed, or even just recited
within the borders of the Austrian state, however that state
defines itself, for the duration of the legal copyright.
I emphasize expressly that I do not want to have anything to do
with the Austrian state and that I reject in perpetuity not only all
interference but any overtures in that regard by this Austrian
state concerning my person or my work. After my death, not a
word shall be published from my papers, wherever such may
still exist, including letters and scraps of paper. 103
Despite this impassioned articulation, Bernhard’s successors allowed
the production of his plays in Austria ten years after his death. 104 They
were persuaded that denying multiple generations of his countrymen
access to his performed works would ultimately cause the death of those
works. 105
E.

Structure of Instructions

If an author’s restrictions merely constitute a condition on the gift
itself, it is not clear that the sorts of instructions just described would
accomplish the desired goal. For example, a bequest to one’s spouse of
“my copyrights so long as they are not exploited in the context of
advertising” would convey a fee simple determinable. 106 In such a case,
the author-testator—in actuality, his estate—would retain a reversionary
interest (a possibility of reverter). 107
So if, for example, the spouse violated the condition and used the
copyrights in advertising, the copyrights would revert to the estate and,
if the spouse were the sole beneficiary or heir, she would own the rights
in fee simple and could do with them as she pleased. Even if the authortestator had successfully devised the residue of his estate to someone
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

GITTA HONEGGER, THOMAS BERNHARD: THE MAKING OF AN AUSTRIAN ix (2001).
Id. at 306 (quoting HANS HÖLLER, THOMAS BERNHARD 7 (2d ed. 1993)).
Id. at 305–06.
Id. at 306.
Id.
DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 43, at 836.
Id.
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else—say, Alma Mater University—that party would then own the
copyrights outright following the spouse’s violation of the condition. No
doubt, in the latter case, the surviving spouse would think twice about
violating the condition. Nevertheless, the point is that in structuring the
gift in this way, some living person(s) or extant organization(s) (or their
successors)—or a combination thereof—would ultimately be able to
make autonomous decisions about the works until the copyright term
expired.
Furthermore, an instruction that is precatory is, by its very nature, not
binding on the fiduciary. Thus, a mere request or hope expressed in a
testamentary instrument that the fiduciary will exploit the author’s
copyrights in a particular way would not be enforceable. 108 Nor would
an instrument that fails to meet the basic requirements of a properly
executed will or trust. 109
For these reasons, authors may attempt to exercise control by framing
their artistic instructions, like Yauch did, as a duty imposed upon a
fiduciary, whether an executor or a trustee. In his case, the instruction
appears in the part of the will where Yauch sets out the powers that he
conferred upon his executor, whom he named as his wife in the first
instance. 110
In order to accomplish what Yauch apparently sought to do, imposing
a fiduciary duty makes sense. Fiduciaries—whether personal
representatives (that is, executors or administrators) or trustees—owe
duties in the execution of their charges. 111 With respect to the duty of
loyalty, this means administration of the trust “solely in the interests of
the beneficiaries.” 112 With respect to the duty of prudent

108. For an interesting account of the role that the gender of the testator plays in crucial drafting
choices, see Alyssa A. DiRusso, He Says, She Asks: Gender, Language, and the Law of Precatory
Words in Wills, 22 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 1 (2007).
109. Deborah Gordon has described a particular means of leaving instructions or expressing
preferences—what she terms “letters non-testamentary,” Deborah S. Gordon, Letters NonTestamentary, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 585, 588–89 (2014), which include the more familiar “letter of
wishes.” Id. at 615–16. These are non-binding letters written by a decedent to accompany a formal
testamentary instrument for a variety of reasons. Id. at 629–30.
110. Will of Adam Yauch, at 1, ¶ 5 (N.Y. Surr. Ct.) (June 6, 2001). As is the case for many
wealthy, privacy-seeking testators, Yauch’s will poured all of his assets into an inter vivos trust that
he had created. Id. at 1, ¶ 2; see also DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 43, at 466 (describing use
of pour-over wills and trusts and the relative privacy they afford). The trust instrument is not
publicly available, so it is impossible to know whether Yauch instructed his trustees similarly.
111. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 3-703(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (subjecting personal
representatives to the same “standards of care applicable to trustees”).
112. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802(a) (UNIF. LAW. COMM’N 2000); accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TRUSTS § 78 (AM. LAW INST. 2007).
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administration—the care norm—a trustee is to “exercise reasonable care,
skill, and caution” in “administer[ing] the trust as a prudent person
would, by considering the purposes” and “terms” of the trust. 113 Above
all, a fiduciary must administer the estate or trust “in accordance with its
terms and purposes.” 114 Accordingly, exploitation of the decedent’s
copyrights in violation of the prescribed terms would seem to constitute
a breach of fiduciary duty. 115
Kate O’Neill offers another relevant example with respect to the
intellectual property left behind by J.D. Salinger. Salinger, who died in
2010, had created a literary trust in 2008 to hold his copyrights and,
likely, his manuscripts and other writings. 116 O’Neill suggests that
actions taken after his death by the trustees, his wife Colleen and son
Matthew, 117 so far signal that they intend to continue Salinger’s stringent
position on exploitation of his copyrights and publicity rights. 118 O’Neill
writes:
[W]e can only speculate about the extent of the trustees’
discretion and how they may ultimately manage Salinger’s
literary assets. [There are] . . . rumors that the trust directed the
trustees to “wait a number of years” before publishing anything
new. As to previously published work, some journalists
speculated—shortly after Salinger’s death—that the trustees
might be tempted by a proposal to license a movie based on
[The] Catcher [in the Rye] because of the possibility that the
federal tax on Salinger’s estate, which was zero in 2010, might
be increased retroactively. That no longer seems likely, and
there is no indication that a movie deal is in the works. At best,
we can see that Salinger shielded his work and his person from
public scrutiny in death as he had in life, and so far, the trustees
113. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 804; accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 77(1)–(2).
114. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 801; accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 76 (“The trustee has
a duty to administer the trust, diligently and in good faith, in accordance with the terms of the trust
and applicable law.”).
115. It is true, however, that to the extent the authorial instructions are deemed to create what is
known as an honorary trust, the “honorary trustee [would be] at liberty to perform or to terminate
the interest and distribute the corpus to residuary legatees or heirs whenever she pleases.” Adam J.
Hirsch, Bequests for Purposes: A Unified Theory, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 33, 91 (1999); see also
discussion infra at section II.C.1.
116. Kate O’Neill, Copyright Law and the Management of J.D. Salinger’s Literary Estate, 31
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 19, 28 (2012).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 28–29. Salinger, as is well known, was fiercely protective of his work. See, e.g.,
Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 70–71 (2d Cir. 2010); Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d
90, 92–94 (2d Cir. 1987).
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seem to be following his example. This could be because the
trust so directs them, because they choose to do so in deference
to his memory, or due to personal reasons. 119
In the remainder of this Article, I contextualize and evaluate the sorts
of control mechanisms described up to this point.
II.

CURRENT VITAL SIGNS OF DEAD-HAND CONTROL

A number of questions emerge in the wake of this survey of methods
by which authors attempt to control the fates of their works after their
deaths. Most particularly, if a fiduciary disregards an artistic
instruction—to disallow quotations, to wait a number of years before
publishing new editions, to exploit copyrights solely in a non-advertising
context, to refuse to license adaptations, etc.—should he be liable for
such action? Relatedly, if a fiduciary adheres to these instructions, could
he nevertheless still be liable for a breach of fiduciary duty? How willing
should courts be to modify or terminate such provisions? In order to
address these questions, this Part considers both the justifications for
long-term post-death controls over property more generally and the
corresponding justifications for interfering with such controls. It also
evaluates relevant legislative and judicial activity outside of the realm of
intellectual property. In Part III, I will apply the lessons from this
exploration to the particular context of artistic instructions.
A.

Justifications for Dead-Hand Control

The Restatement (Third) of Property underscores that U.S. “law does
not grant courts any general authority to question the wisdom, fairness,
or reasonableness of the donor’s decisions about how to allocate his or
her property.” 120 Indeed, “[p]roperty owners have the nearly unrestricted
right to dispose of their property as they please.” 121 Over time,
commentators have assembled a bustling laundry list of justifications for
this general principle of testamentary freedom, including that it comports
with natural law, generates wealth accumulation, promotes industry and

119. O’Neill, supra note 116, at 30.
120. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. c
(AM. LAW INST. 2003); see also id. § 10.1 (“The donor’s intention is given effect to the maximum
extent allowed by law.”).
121. Id. § 10.1 cmt. a.
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productivity, fosters happiness, reinforces family ties, and provides the
simplest solution for disposing of property at an owner’s death. 122
Daniel Kelly, for example, draws upon an economic or functional
approach to testamentary freedom, which “emphasizes the ‘social
welfare’ of the parties and seeks to determine how the law can create the
best incentives for the donor, donees, and other parties that a donor’s
disposition of property may affect.” 123 He argues that “effectuating a
donor’s ex ante interests is often consistent with maximizing social
welfare” largely for the reasons just listed. 124 And, he extends this
analysis in support of trust law—the primary vehicle for facilitating
dead-hand control—which historically has revolved around the intent of
the settlor. 125 By contrast, Kirsten Rabe Smolensky emphasizes the
dignity or autonomy interests of the dead as a basis for according what
she terms “posthumous rights.” 126
While such attempts to mount a unified theory in favor of
testamentary freedom are helpful, a discrete set of considerations is
raised by the prospect of allowing individuals not only to dispose of
their property at death but also to prescribe enforceable instructions as to
its treatment over time—that is, by the prospect of dead-hand control. 127
Specifically, a number of the aforementioned justifications for plainvanilla testamentary freedom are less persuasive as bases for dead-hand
control. In their seminal article, Adam Hirsch and William Wang argue,
for example, that premising such control on the fostering of family ties
among remote family members who do not know each other is not
persuasive. 128 Likewise, the notion that an ancestor possesses knowledge
superior to that of the state concerning the needs of his descendants—the
122. E.g., Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Succession—Its Past, Future and Justification, in DEATH,
TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 3, 5 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977); Tritt, supra note 46, at 117.
“A compelling argument in favor of [testamentary freedom] is that it accords with human wishes.”
LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 21 (1955).
123. Daniel B. Kelly, Restricting Testamentary Freedom: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications,
82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125, 1135 (2013).
124. Id. at 1137.
125. See id. at 1134 (collecting sources).
126. Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Rights of the Dead, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 763, 774–75 (2009)
(adopting an “Interest Theory” approach “because it acknowledges that the dead can have interests
that survive death”).
127. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 711 (9th ed. 2014)
(describing dead-hand control as arising “when death does not result in a clean transfer to living
persons that permits them to do with the money as they please”); supra note 48 and accompanying
text.
128. Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 IND. L.J.
1, 15–16 (1992).
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“father knows best” hypothesis 129—is less compelling when the ancestor
is not a parent, but a great-great grandparent. 130 And it can hardly be said
that giving effect to long-ago created future interests (or analogously
imposed restrictions 131) is the simplest method for disposing of
property. 132 What remains, Hirsch and Wang submit, is the productivityincentive justification, which can—in theory—justify the enforcement of
future interests or like mechanisms to the extent that their availability
stimulates the amassing of greater fortunes by donors. 133
Writing separately, Hirsch has also addressed the particular context of
bequests that have as a goal something other than the financial welfare
of individuals. 134 He points out that testators sometimes have purposes in
mind that fall in between, on the one hand, charitable purposes (favored
under the law) and, on the other, capricious or detrimental purposes
(disfavored). 135 The middle category includes “bequests for an amalgam
of purposes perceived neither to help nor to harm the public.” 136
Arguably, many of the artistic restrictions described above would fall
into that middle category 137 because they appear to be about more than
the mere financial betterment of the beneficiaries. Rather, the decedent
authors seem to have a particular purpose—an artistic purpose—in mind.

129. Id. at 12.
130. Id. at 15. Along similar lines, Joshua Tate argues that incentive trusts might be justified on
the father-knows-best principle where the beneficiaries are known to the settlor. Joshua C. Tate,
Conditional Love: Incentive Trusts and the Inflexibility Problem, 41 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.
445, 485–86 (2006).
131. See generally Molly S. Van Houweling, The Dead Hand of Copyright 13–31 (Oct. 7, 2014)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing a range of non-possessory use
restrictions and limitations thereon).
132. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 128, at 15.
133. Id. at 16; accord Tate, supra note 130, at 486; cf. Hirsch, supra note 115, at 52 (“[T]he
opportunity to make bequests for purposes may be of no small interest and concern to testators.”).
134. See generally Hirsch, supra note 115; see also Richard C. Ausness, Non-Charitable Purpose
Trusts: Past, Present, and Future, 51 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 321 (2016).
135. Hirsch, supra note 115, at 34; see also Tamara York, Protecting Minor Children from
Parental Disinheritance: A Proposal for Awarding a Compulsory Share of the Parental Estate,
1997 DET. C.L. MICH. ST. U. L. REV. 861, 878–79 (“Where the testator’s provision is merely
capricious and the performance . . . will benefit no one, the courts will not compel its execution,
despite the wishes of the testator.”).
136. Hirsch, supra note 115, at 34.
137. See supra section I.D. It is not entirely clear whether, in Hirsch’s terminology, the gifts
covered by the artistic restrictions described in section I.D. would best be described as bequests to
persons, with a use-restriction tacked on, or as what Hirsch conceives of as classic bequests for
purposes (and if the latter, whether they would be deemed bequests for “social” or “personal”
purposes). See Hirsch, supra note 115, at 51–52 (discussing the distinctions). If they are bequests to
persons, he argues, the restrictions would more likely be enforceable. Id. at 102.
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Hirsch argues that bequests for purposes are also justified on the
productivity-incentive thesis. In particular, testators gain personal
satisfaction from directing their wealth at projects they care about,138
including those that are very personal in nature—such as preserving
one’s memory or providing a reminder that one was here. 139 These sorts
of bequests may also reflect our emotional ties to our property: “just as
we wish to provide for loved ones after we are gone, so may we strive to
ensure, for similar if not identical reasons, that treasured objects are
protected.” 140
David Horton develops these themes in arguing that dead-hand
control provides a valuable means of self-expression, which allows the
testator to communicate how he wishes to be remembered. 141 The case
that animates Horton’s article is that of deceased Chicago dentist Max
Feinberg, who, as he grew older, “became preoccupied with the high rate
of intermarriage among young Jews and with his own family’s
gravitation toward other cultures and traditions.” 142 Shortly before his
death, Feinberg “insert[ed] a restriction into his trust: ‘A descendant of
mine . . . who marries outside the Jewish faith . . . shall be deemed to be
deceased for all purposes of this instrument . . . .’” 143 When, two decades
later, Feinberg’s grandchildren grew disenchanted with the “Jewish
clause,” they challenged its validity in court.144 The Illinois Supreme
Court unanimously upheld Feinberg’s wishes. 145 Horton favors such
enhanced willingness to effectuate testamentary provisions—to which he

138. Hirsch, supra note 115, at 53 (noting that, in comparison to the case for bequests to persons,
“when a testator makes a bequest for a social purpose, her utility may derive from a more diffuse
association with the undefined group that benefits”).
139. Id. at 56.
140. Id. at 57; see also Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957,
959 (1982) (discussing the sorts of “objects [that] are closely bound up with personhood”).
141. Horton, supra note 47, at 78; see also Hirsch, supra note 115, at 53–54. Horton, while
recognizing the distinction between outright dispositions at death and dead-hand control, would
extend this justification to both. See Horton, supra note 47, at 63–64 & n.17, 78 (distinguishing
between posthumous conditions and bequests for purposes, on the one hand, and mere distributional
choices, on the other).
142. Horton, supra note 47, at 62.
143. Id. (citation omitted).
144. Id.
145. In re Estate of Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d 888, 905–06 (Ill. 2009). In effect this is so, although the
facts were complicated and also turned on his surviving wife’s exercise of a power of appointment.
See id. at 892. For more discussion of this kind of restriction, see infra notes 208–11 and
accompanying text.
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would sometimes afford First Amendment protections 146—because of
their expressive nature: they serve as “a ringing declaration of [a
testator’s] core beliefs.” 147
This expressiveness can turn up in more ordinary contexts. For
example, Horton invokes a hypothetical (originally formulated by John
Langbein 148) about a long-term IBM employee who instructs his trustees
not to sell his large block of IBM stock because of his high esteem for,
and loyalty to, the company. 149 Horton argues that a chief reason to
uphold such a bequest is its communicative dimension—it allows the
employee to express himself and to comment on his life. 150
Each of these justifications—serving as an incentive to productivity,
providing personal satisfaction, preserving one’s memory, reflecting
emotional ties to one’s authored works, and constituting a means of selfexpression—could plausibly justify dead-hand control over intellectual
property, as an initial matter. Nevertheless, it is clear that there are real
costs associated with dead-hand control. As I discuss next, these costs
counsel in favor of caution and, in some cases, regulation by the state. 151
B.

Justifications for Regulating Dead-Hand Control

Hirsch and Wang reasonably contend that “[a]s a matter of public
policy, lawmakers should consider not only for how long but also in
what ways a testator proposes to control property after her death.” 152
This begs the question: when is regulation of control by a dead hand
warranted? Commentators have carved up the landscape along various
dimensions. One approach would consider, qualitatively or categorically,

146. Horton, supra note 47, at 89. Horton acknowledges that state interference with these
provisions does not amount to suppression in the sense that it denies the testator or settlor the ability
to speak. Id. at 67, 98, 101. Nevertheless, he argues that at least some restrictions do trigger First
Amendment scrutiny because “the ultimate distribution of a decedent’s property and testamentary
self-expression are more tightly entwined than they first seem.” Id. at 67.
147. Id. at 66.
148. See John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1105,
1112–13 (2004) [hereinafter Langbein, Mandatory Rules]; John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent
Investor Act and the Future of Trust Investing, 81 IOWA L. REV. 641, 664 (1996) [hereinafter
Langbein, Uniform Prudent Investor Act].
149. Horton, supra note 47, at 107–08.
150. See id. Horton also argues that expressive values help explain the contexts in which courts
do and do not permit a testator’s purpose to be upheld. See id. at 103–04.
151. See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 128, at 17; Horton, supra note 47, at 102; Kelly, supra note
123, at 1138.
152. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 128, at 4; see also Eric Rakowski, The Future Reach of the
Disembodied Will, 4 POL., PHIL. & ECON. 91, 96–98 (2005) (addressing this distinction).
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the proposed form of control. Hirsch and Wang, for example, distinguish
among restrictions on the subsequent use, investment, or distribution of
property. 153
Use restrictions, because they “can directly impair the value of
property,” are “powerful and draining,” 154 “resulting [in the] suboptimal
use of resources.” 155 These sorts of restrictions stand in contrast to
distribution restrictions—that is, imposed allocations among groups of
beneficiaries—which have wealth consequences that derive from more
nebulous transaction costs and risk-aversion considerations. 156
Accordingly, a stronger “case can be made for regulating use restrictions
more stringently than distribution restrictions.” 157
With respect to investment restrictions, Hirsch and Wang argue that
“[w]hen a testator places a future interest in trust, beneficiaries and
society both profit by the property’s enhanced marketability.” 158 Given
evidence of risk aversion in most people, instructions to a trustee to
diversify trust investments would likely accord with the preferences of
most beneficiaries, and should be enforceable. 159 “By contrast, were the
testator (perversely) to mandate investment concentration, thereby
heightening risk, most beneficiaries would likely agree that dead hand
control was worth paying to avoid.” 160 Accordingly, “[d]iminished value

153. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 128, at 4. The first two categories, use and investment, are more
salient for present purposes.
154. Id. at 50. Hirsch and Wang, it must be said, do repeatedly acknowledge the existence of use
restrictions aimed at shaping the use of a particular asset rather than constraining the beneficiaries’
behavior for their own benefit. Cf. id. at 21 n.76 (“The testator’s concern, in other words, might not
be (only) that the beneficiary use his inheritance in a certain way, but that Blackacre itself be used in
a certain way.” (emphasis in original)). Accordingly, “[f]or a few testators, . . . particular pieces of
property may have sentimental value, which could increase their subjective preference for a legal
use restriction and compensate to some degree for its added social cost.” Id. at 20–21.
155. Id. at 22; accord Rakowski, supra note 152, at 104. Hirsch and Wang posit this justification
for intervention whether the utilitarian maxim is wealth maximization or a broader view of social
welfare enhancement. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 128, at 24.
156. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 128, at 50. “While the prospect of arbitrariness provides a
rationale for their limitation, intergenerational distribution restrictions also bring benefits in the form of
increased wealth conservation. Viewed broadly, distribution restrictions appear less burdensome than
restrictions that funnel wealth into the provision of specific goods and services.” Id.
157. Id. Hirsch and Wang suggest several possibilities, such as including specific durational
limits under the Rule Against Perpetuities aimed at use restrictions; rendering them unenforceable
after a certain period; imposing additional estate tax consequences; or facilitating modification. See
id. at 51.
158. Id. at 52.
159. See id. at 31.
160. Id. at 32. Hirsch and Wang do acknowledge that restrictions to preserve certain assets might
be imposed out of sentimental attachment. Id. at 28 n.105.
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and arbitrariness would continue to justify the regulation of such
trusts.” 161 These points together accord with Hirsch’s separately
articulated view that bequests for purposes that are socially injurious
justify intervention. 162
Smolensky, who, as previously mentioned, largely favors posthumous
rights on dignity and autonomy grounds, also recognizes the need for
limits. “[I]nterests that ‘can no longer be helped or harmed by
posthumous events,’ such as a secret desire for personal achievement,
die upon the death of the interest-holder.” 163 Her preferred limitations—
based on trends she identifies in the case law—would consider the
impossibility of giving effect to the right,164 the importance of the
right, 165 the passage of time, 166 and the degree of conflict of interest
between the living and the dead. 167
Another tack would divide the world of regulatory justifications along
the dimension of time into two camps, ex ante and ex post. 168 For Daniel
Kelly, for instance, only ex ante bases are justifiable from an economic
perspective because ex post considerations do not take into consideration
the “donor’s happiness during life, the donor’s incentive to work, save,
and invest, and the structure and timing of a donor’s gifts.” 169 If donors
sense that courts will not effectuate their intent, he argues, they will be
less likely to work and save in the first place, and they will have less to
pass on at death. 170 Furthermore, donees as a class will suffer under ex
post meddling, even if it appears rational to do so in a given case,
because donors will be less inclined to generate and pass on the same
amount. 171
161. Id. at 52.
162. Hirsch, supra note 115, at 70, 83.
163. Smolensky, supra note 126, at 771–72 (quoting Joel Feinberg, Harm and Self-Interest, in
RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY: ESSAYS IN SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 45, 64–65
(1980)).
164. Id. at 775.
165. Id. at 781.
166. Id. at 789.
167. Id. at 791.
168. Binaries are common in this area of scholarship (as in so many others). See, e.g., Gregory S.
Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth Century, 37 STAN. L. REV.
1189, 1257 (1985) (distinguishing between social and economic justifications for regulation of
dead-hand control).
169. Kelly, supra note 123, at 1129. Kelly acknowledges that while his view privileges ex ante
considerations as a basis for interfering with testamentary freedom, that is a different question from
“whether intervention is socially desirable.” Id. at 1157 n.205.
170. Id. at 1151, 1167.
171. Id. at 1167–68.
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Kelly therefore deems only the existence of imperfect information,
negative externalities, and intergenerational equity concerns as
legitimate bases for intervening in donative transfers at death because
these take into account the donor’s ex ante perspective. 172 It should be
noted, however, that the first of these exceptions threatens to swallow
the rule because, by definition, testators are always acting with imperfect
information. 173 In any event, Kelly would rule out as illegitimate both
intervening to maximize the donees’ ex post interests and downplaying
what are perceived as idiosyncratic preferences by donors.174 “In short,
the living may themselves benefit if the law allows a certain degree of
dead hand control.” 175
In highly influential scholarship, John Langbein has colorfully argued
that the “characteristic sphere for the application of the anti-dead-hand
rule has been the fringe world of the eccentric settlor: the crackpot who
wants to brick up her house, or build statues of himself, or dictate
children’s marital choices.” 176 Langbein maintains that the most
persuasive basis for interfering with dead-hand control is “fundamentally
a change-of-circumstances doctrine”:
The living donor can always change his or her mind, as he or she
observes the consequences of an unwise course of conduct, or as
other circumstances change, but the settlor who is deceased or
who, though living, occupies a decedent-like relationship to the
trust by having made the trust’s terms irrevocable cannot. 177
While this view in some respects could accord with Kelly’s preferred
basis for regulation (an ex ante perspective that accounts for, say,
imperfect information at the time of drafting), it is clear that Langbein’s
focal point is the welfare of the beneficiaries. Ultimately, he posits,
restraints on dead-hand control largely reflect the principle that trusts
must be for the benefit of the beneficiaries:
The rule against capricious purposes deals with the easy cases
(‘caprice’ means whim or sudden fancy), but leaves the
172. Id. at 1128.
173. Kelly himself recognizes this inevitability in the will or trust drafting context. Id. at 1160.
174. Id. at 1165. Kelly and Hirsch share common ground here. See Hirsch, supra note 115, at 78
(“[A] testator’s motives for ‘capricious’ purpose bequests may well prove substantial after all—no
less so than those underlying other ones of the ‘normal’ variety.”).
175. Kelly, supra note 123, at 1185.
176. Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 148, at 1111. As he predicted, however, “the
benefit-the-beneficiaries rule [may also] set limits upon a more common form of settlor direction,
the value-impairing investment instruction.” Id.
177. Id.; accord STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 70–71
(2004).
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underlying policy unexpressed. By refashioning the rule to spell
out that a valid trust must benefit the beneficiaries, the Third
Restatement and the [Uniform Trust] Code articulate the policy
that has been at work in these cases. . . . [A] trust must advance
“the interests of the beneficiaries of the trust.” 178
For that reason, with respect to his previously discussed example of
the IBM employee’s instruction to retain stock, 179 Langbein himself
would strike such a provision under the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule. 180
This is because “[m]odern portfolio theory instructs us that the investor
who diversifies thoroughly virtually always improves the odds of doing
better than a one-stock portfolio, regardless of what the stock is.” 181
There has not, however, been universal approval of the benefit-thebeneficiaries restriction on trust investment. Significantly, Jeffrey
Cooper has taken it to task and argued that “[r]ather than a simple update
of a single rule of trust law, the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule is a
distinctly modern doctrine that combines selected strands of multiple
traditional rules of trust law.” 182 He argues that the benefit-thebeneficiaries rule represents a drastic departure from settled law favoring
the intent of the settlor, especially in the area of investment directives. 183
Thus, he would be more willing to uphold the IBM stock retention
directive where the settlor is acting less out of loyalty than out of a
conviction that under-diversification would maximize investment
returns. 184 Nevertheless, even Cooper acknowledges that there are
circumstances in which testamentary intent may be overridden,

178. Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 148, at 1108 (quoting Colonial Trust Co. v. Brown,
135 A. 555, 564 (Conn. 1926) (internal quotation marks omitted) (footnotes omitted)); accord John
H. Langbein, Burn the Rembrandt? Trust Law’s Limits on the Settlor’s Power to Direct Investments,
90 B.U. L. REV. 375, 377, 383 (2010) [hereinafter Langbein, Burn the Rembrandt?] (“What the
Restatement (Third) of Trusts and the Uniform Trust Code have done in articulating the benefit-thebeneficiaries standard is simply to clarify that long implicit principle.”).
179. See supra notes 148–50 and accompanying text.
180. Langbein, Burn the Rembrandt?, supra note 178, at 386.
181. Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 148, at 1113 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 227 cmts. e, g, at 19–24, 25–28 (AM. LAW INST. 1992)); id.
(“Failure to diversify imposes upon the portfolio what is called uncompensated risk, risk that can be
costlessly avoided by spreading the investment across many asset classes and many distinct security
issues.”); Langbein, Uniform Prudent Investor Act, supra note 148, at 646–49; see also Langbein,
Burn the Rembrandt?, supra note 178, at 387.
182. Jeffrey A. Cooper, Shades of Gray: Applying the Benefit-the-Beneficiaries Rule to Trust
Investment Directives, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2383, 2386 (2010).
183. Id. at 2393, 2395.
184. Id. at 2397; see also Jeffrey A. Cooper, Empty Promises: Settlor’s Intent, the Uniform Trust
Code, and the Future of Trust Investment Law, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1165, 1175 (2008).
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including rare cases in which public policy dictates as much. 185 He
seems to favor continued judicial balancing of the interests, which could,
in principle, result in a ruling contrary to the settlor’s intent. 186
A few things might be said at this juncture. Hirsch and Wang’s
concerns about use and investment restrictions 187 could readily map onto
many of the authorial instructions described above. 188 A prohibition on
adaptations, for example, could be considered a restriction on the use of
an authored work or, additionally, a restriction on investment to the
extent that the fiduciary is hindered from exploiting the work’s full
economic value. Smolensky’s categories are also useful here: 189 while
impossibility would not typically be relevant, the importance of the
right, the passage of time, and the seriousness of the conflict between the
living and the dead would all seem to be so, with one caveat discussed
below. 190
For his part, Kelly acknowledges that giving effect to a donor’s ex
ante interests will not always maximize social welfare. He admits, for
instance, that sometimes “effectuating a donor’s interests may conflict
with maximizing social welfare, i.e., restricting testamentary freedom
may decrease the donor’s utility, but the decrease might be outweighed
by an increase in the donee’s utility.” 191 In addition, while he does not
view the discounting of idiosyncratic instructions as a cogent reason for
intervening, he would justify intervention to the extent that those same
instructions caused negative externalities, 192 a situation that may occur
with artistic restrictions. Finally, while taking opposite positions on the
benefit-the-beneficiaries rule, Langbein and Cooper both acknowledge
the need for room to deviate from testamentary intent. 193 Langbein’s
prism suggests that if constraints are justified in this context, it will often

185. Cooper, supra note 182, at 2391 (“Courts traditionally have set aside trust investment
directives on public policy grounds solely when the settlor attempts to mandate a degree of waste
that a well-ordered society cannot tolerate.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
186. Id. at 2400.
187. See supra notes 153–61 and accompanying text.
188. See supra section I.D.
189. See supra notes 163–67 and accompanying text.
190. See infra notes 316 and 318 and accompanying text.
191. Kelly, supra note 123, at 1157 n.205. In a seemingly related vein (Kelly acknowledges that
the issues are related, id.), Kelly distinguishes economic from social desirability, and he
acknowledges that the dictates of one might diverge from the other. For example, he seems to
concede that “[f]rom an ex post perspective, restricting testamentary freedom in order to maximize
the donees’ interests would be socially desirable.” Id. at 1167.
192. Id. at 1169.
193. See supra notes 176–81, 185–86 and accompanying text.
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be the beneficiaries’ interests—and not society’s interests more
generally—that will provide the constraints. 194 Cooper, by contrast,
would justify incursion into testamentary intent primarily where
society’s interests are at stake 195 as well as to further the settlor’s
ultimate goals. 196 In many instances of authorial control, all of these are
the very interests that hang in the balance.
C.

Legal Treatment of Dead-Hand Control

It remains to consider the current state of the law. As a starting point,
the Restatement (Third) of Property provides that “American law
curtails freedom of disposition only to the extent that the donor attempts
to make a disposition or achieve a purpose that is prohibited or restricted
by an overriding rule of law.” 197 It sets out a non-exhaustive list of such
circumstances:
Among the rules of law that prohibit or restrict freedom of
disposition in certain instances are those relating to spousal
rights; creditors’ rights; unreasonable restraints on alienation or
marriage; provisions promoting separation or divorce;
impermissible racial or other categoric restrictions; provisions
encouraging illegal activity; and the rules against perpetuities
and accumulations. 198
Since the legal landscape covered by this motley group is vast, in this
section I will focus on trends of note, which point toward both more and
less deference to testamentary intent.
1.

Enhanced Deference to Testamentary Intent

A number of recent trends point in the direction of enhanced
deference to testator intent, which would potentially favor posthumous
artistic control. One of the most prominent trends is the scaling back of
the once mighty Rule Against Perpetuities (“RAP”). The RAP limits
194. See supra notes 178–81 and accompanying text.
195. Cooper, supra note 182, at 2391.
196. Cooper, supra note 184, at 1170, 1213.
197. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. c
(AM. LAW INST. 2003).
198. Id. The Uniform Trust Code and Uniform Probate Code are to similar effect. See UNIF.
TRUST CODE § 404 (UNIF. LAW. COMM’N 2000) (“A trust may be created only to the extent its
purposes are lawful, not contrary to public policy, and possible to achieve. A trust and its terms
must be for the benefit of its beneficiaries.”); UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 2-201 to -214 (UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 2010) (elective share rights for surviving spouses); id. §§ 2-901 to -905 (Rule Against
Perpetuities); id. §§ 3-801 to -816 (creditor rights).
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trust duration to roughly one hundred years. 199 But it has now been
abolished in approximately twenty-one jurisdictions. 200 In these states,
settlors of trusts are free to micromanage the vesting of property
interests indefinitely. 201 While the reasons for this shift are complex and
include competition among states to lure wealthy trust business, 202 the
upshot is increased deference to long-dead settlors.
Another trend is the apparent uptick in so-called “incentive trusts,”
that is, trusts that “attach fixed conditions on distributions . . . that leave
less discretion to the trustee.” 203 Ranging from “provisions requiring the
beneficiaries to graduate from college, achieve a certain grade point
average, or earn a certain amount of income in order to qualify for
distributions from the trust,” these sorts of clauses have seemed to gain
traction. 204 Some incentive trusts even feature moral or religious or
family-oriented goals established by the settlor. 205 By their nature, these
sorts of restraints raise the very real possibility that the trusts will prove
inflexible as circumstances develop. 206 Nevertheless, given the types of
the goals they set out to accomplish, a case can be made that courts
should be less willing to modify or terminate these sorts of trusts. 207
While the marketing and terminology of incentive trusts is relatively
new, courts have long enforced certain conditions to the receipt of funds
by beneficiaries. 208 Such conditions have been used, for example, to
199. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 43, at 880.
200. Horton, supra note 47, at 64 n.18 (assembling jurisdictions as of 2012).
201. Id. at 64 (“Settlors in these [non-RAP] states can now write their estate plans on a canvas the
size of eternity.”).
202. See generally Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50
UCLA L. REV. 1303, 1314–16 (2003); Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional
Competition for Trust Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356,
373–78 (2005); Stewart E. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition to Abolish the Rule Against
Perpetuities: R.I.P. for the R.A.P., 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2097, 2100–05 (2003).
203. Tate, supra note 130, at 448.
204. Id.
205. See, e.g., id. at 458 (“[C]ommon provisions offer a financial incentive for a beneficiary who
leaves the workplace to stay at home with young children or marries a stay-at-home parent.”). One
amusing provision would distribute “$10,000 upon the first marriage of each descendant of mine,
provided that the new spouse has never gone to law school.” Id. at 457–58 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting John J. Scroggin, Family Incentive Trusts, J. FIN. SERV. PROF’LS, at 74, 87
(2000)).
206. Id. at 449.
207. Id. at 491.
208. Gareth H. Jones, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY
PROPERTY 119, 120 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977) (agreeing but also acknowledging that
courts, by longstanding tradition, will not uphold “conditions which are criminal, tortious, or
otherwise contrary to public policy”).
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encourage the marriage of a beneficiary to a spouse of a particular
religion. 209 These have been upheld particularly where the condition is
viewed merely as a partial restraint upon marriage (rather than as a
restraint on marriage altogether or on religious practice). 210
Commentators have taken opposing views on the enforceability of these
sort of conditions. 211
Another visible trend reflecting deference to testators is the rise of
“honorary trusts,” which allow decedents to designate property for
particular non-charitable purposes that provide no benefit to an
ascertainable human beneficiary. Classic examples include cemetery
upkeep and the care of beloved pets. 212 Early on, the legal status of these
sorts of bequests was uncertain because they did not name a human
beneficiary with legal standing to enforce the trust’s terms—a stalwart
requirement for an enforceable trust. 213 Subsequently, however, the
Restatement of Trusts in 1935 explicitly blessed the concept of an
honorary (or intended) trust, which is not actually an enforceable trust
but is rather “treated as a power, which the intended trustee may carry
out if she so chooses; otherwise, the residuary legatee or heirs can sue
for a resulting trust to recover the corpus of the bequest.” 214 Thus, under
contemporary common law principles, the intended trustee can care for
Fido if she wishes although she cannot be compelled to do so. 215
Additionally, most states have enacted an array of specific laws, which

209. See, e.g., Shapira v. Union Nat’l Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825, 826–32 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1974)
(construing a will that imposed a requirement that the putative beneficiary marry “a Jewish girl
whose both parents were Jewish” in order to receive his bequest); In re Estate of Keffalas, 233 A.2d
248, 250–51 (Pa. 1967) (upholding bequests “on condition that such child marry one of ‘true Greek
blood and descent and of Orthodox religion’”).
210. Shapira, 315 N.E.2d at 829; Keffalas, 233 A.2d at 250; accord Jones, supra note 208, at
126–27. On the validity of bequests conditioned on specific religious practice, see Smolensky,
supra note 126, at 793 n.135.
211. Compare Ronald J. Scalise Jr., Public Policy and Antisocial Testators, 32 CARDOZO L. REV.
1315 (2011) (largely favoring enforcement of such conditions), with Sherman, supra note 48, at
1329 (arguing that “[t]estamentary conditions calculated to restrain legatees’ personal conduct
should not be enforced”).
212. E.g., In re Searight’s Estate, 95 N.E.2d 779, 781–82 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950); Frances H.
Foster, Should Pets Inherit?, 63 FLA. L. REV. 801, 816–17 (2011); Hirsch, supra note 115, at 45.
213. Hirsch, supra note 115, at 42–44 (describing the varying treatment of such bequests by
nineteenth century courts). They were also problematic under the Rule Against Perpetuities, id.,
particularly in the case of pets, because pets could not serve as “measuring lives,” Foster, supra note
212, at 817.
214. Hirsch, supra note 115, at 44–46; accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 47 (AM. LAW
INST. 2003).
215. E.g., Searight’s Estate, 95 N.E.2d at 782.
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diverge from traditional trust requirements, to further ensure the carrying
out of these sorts of bequests. 216
2.

Decreased Deference to Testamentary Intent

At the same time, however, there are also trends pointing away from
deference to testamentary intent, which would potentially disfavor
posthumous artistic control. 217 Indeed, some have suggested that the rise
of the perpetual trust (that is, the decline of the RAP) has required
corresponding flexibility elsewhere. 218 One area where this loosening of
testamentary control is most prominent is in the realm of trust
termination and modification.
Once upon a time in the United States, 219 it was difficult to modify the
terms of a trust or terminate it altogether. In the leading case of Claflin v.
Claflin, 220 the settlor had established a trust to pay one of his sons ten
thousand dollars periodically and the balance when he turned thirty. 221
Clearly chafing at the fact that his brother had received property outright
when he had not, the beneficiary (not yet twenty-five) brought a lawsuit
to obtain the principal. 222
In rejecting this request, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
struck a longstanding blow for testamentary freedom. While
acknowledging that the beneficiary’s “interest in the trust fund is vested
and absolute, and that no other person has any interest in it,” 223 the Court
nevertheless deferred to the wishes of the settlor. It reasoned that this
216. See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-8.1 (2010) (honorary trusts for pets); id.
§ 8-1.5 (trusts for cemetery purposes); UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 408–09 (UNIF. LAW. COMM’N 2000);
Foster, supra note 212, at 835. These approaches are meant to reassure testators such as Leona
Helmsley, whose $12 million bequest to her beloved Maltese dog, Trouble, caused much of the
same. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 212, at 802. But they should also reassure more ordinary folk,
since “[a]ccording to recent studies, 27% of American pet owners who have wills include their pets
in their wills.” Id. at 811.
217. See, e.g., Thomas P. Gallanis, The New Direction of American Trust Law, 97 IOWA L. REV.
215, 216 (2011); Kelly, supra note 123, at 1129 (arguing that factoring in ex post considerations is
increasingly common); Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV.
235, 236 (1996).
218. See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 202, at 1331.
219. The treatment here has long diverged from that in the United Kingdom, which long ago
broadened courts’ powers to modify or terminate trusts at the behest of the beneficiaries. E.g.,
Saunders v. Vautier, (1841) 49 Eng. Rep. 282 (Ch.); Kelly, supra note 123, at 1176–77; Tate, supra
note 130, at 466.
220. 20 N.E. 454 (Mass. 1889).
221. Id. at 455.
222. See id.
223. Id.
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was not a situation in which the trust was merely passive, 224 contravened
a rule of law or public policy, or had seen its mission accomplished.225
Indeed, with respect to the latter, it was precisely this scenario that the
settlor had anticipated. 226 Interestingly, aside from paying deference to
testamentary intent, the Court apparently still felt the need to speak to
the objective merits of the provision, noting that “there is not the same
danger that [the beneficiary] will spend the property while it is in the
hands of the trustees as there would be if it were in his own.” 227
The Claflin doctrine (or rule), as it came to be known—that is, the
idea that “a trust cannot be terminated [or modified] prior to the time
fixed for termination, even if all the beneficiaries consent, if termination
[or modification] would be contrary to a material purpose of the
settlor” 228—was widely adopted in other jurisdictions. 229 Robert Sitkoff,
departing from the thrust of Langbein’s approach, has argued that the
settlor, rather than the beneficiaries, is the principal to whom the trustee
is an agent. 230 An upside to Claflin, he suggests, is that it “helps align the
interests of the settlor and the trustee.” 231
More recently, however, law reformers have advocated for increasing
flexibility with respect to trust modification and termination.232
Specifically, the Uniform Trust Code (“UTC”), 233 codified in 2000, and
some states have eased the ability of beneficiaries to modify or terminate
a trust. 234 The UTC distinguishes between two types of triggering
events. First, where all of the beneficiaries consent, courts may modify
or even terminate a trust as long as that action would not be
“inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust.” 235 While this
224. In the words of the court, a “dry trust,” meaning trustee had no duties other than to hold the
property. Id.
225. Id. at 455–56.
226. See id. at 456.
227. Id.
228. Tate, supra note 130, at 468. John Langbein, as part of his systematic effort to highlight the
ways in which trust law has always been “beneficiary-regarding,” Langbein, Burn the Rembrandt?,
supra note 178, at 385, applies that approach to material purpose doctrine as well. “Under the
material purpose doctrine, the court asks whether a disputed trust term has a purpose that is material
to the best interests of the beneficiaries of that trust.” Id. at 382.
229. Tate, supra note 130, at 468; see also Alexander, supra note 168, at 1204.
230. Sitkoff, supra note 24, at 624, 648.
231. Id. at 659.
232. See id. at 660.
233. See UNIF. TRUST CODE (UNIF. LAW. COMM’N 2000).
234. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 15403(b) (West 2017); Horton, supra note 47, at 77 (arguing
that this trend reflects “a concern that stems, in part, from a desire to minimize economic waste”).
235. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 411(b).
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provision gives leeway to courts to make amendments, Joshua Tate
nevertheless sees some continuing vitality for settlor intent because the
settlor’s “material purpose” will trump any proposed changes. 236
Accordingly, the Restatement (Third) of Trusts goes even further in
facilitating opportunities for modification or termination. 237 It explicitly
allows courts to balance the settlor’s purposes against the beneficiaries’
reasons for seeking the change. 238
Second, even without unanimous consent by the beneficiaries, the
UTC permits courts to make changes in the face of unanticipated
circumstances—under the equitable deviation doctrine. 239 Specifically,
courts “may modify the administrative or dispositive terms of a trust or
terminate the trust if, because of circumstances not anticipated by the
settlor, modification or termination will further the purposes of the
trust.” 240 The need to “further the purposes of the trust” might once
again seem to prioritize the settlor’s objectives, especially because the
provision continues on to state that “[t]o the extent practicable, the
modification must be made in accordance with the settlor’s probable
intention.” 241 Nevertheless, since the modification and termination
provisions are mandatory by nature, 242 settlor intent is inherently
downplayed. 243
236. Tate, supra note 130, at 470.
237. It provides that “the beneficiaries cannot compel [a trust’s] termination or modification . . .
after the settlor’s death, [except] with authorization of the court if it determines that the reason(s) for
termination or modification outweigh the material purpose.” See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS
§ 65(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2003). The beneficiaries must be unanimous in their consent to the
modification or termination. Id. § 65(1).
238. Tate, supra note 130, at 473. And, it reflects a vast shift in thinking from the Restatement
(Second) of Trusts, which had provided—in accordance with Claflin—that “[i]f the continuance of
the trust is necessary to carry out a material purpose of the trust, the beneficiaries cannot compel its
termination.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 337 (AM. LAW INST. 1959); id. § 167 cmt. b
(rejecting as a basis for deviation “merely [that] such deviation would be more advantageous to the
beneficiaries than . . . compliance”).
239. The Restatement (Third) of Trusts also has an equitable deviation provision similar to that of
the UTC. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66 (2003). This doctrine has a long history,
stemming back at least as far as a trust set up by Joseph Pulitzer. See In re Pulitzer’s Estate, 249
N.Y.S. 87, 89–91 (Surr. Ct. 1931), aff’d mem., 260 N.Y.S. 975 (App. Div. 1932).
240. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412(a). The UTC also provides that a “court may modify the
administrative terms of a trust if continuation of the trust on its existing terms would be
impracticable or wasteful or impair the trust’s administration.” Id. § 412(b). This also reflects the
principle that trusts (and their terms) “must be for the benefit of [their] beneficiaries.” Id. § 412 cmt.
241. Id. § 412(a); see also Sitkoff, supra note 24, at 661 (“[T]hese liberalizations are designed to
advance the settlors’ probable intent.”); Tate, supra note 130, at 471.
242. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(4).
243. This is because such provisions cannot be overridden by contrary instructions in the trust.
Tate, supra note 130, at 471. In this way, while trust law was historically “regulated by merely
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A final trend of note is the shift toward the benefit-the-beneficiaries
rule, the theoretical underpinnings of which were discussed above. 244
Although still controversial, the UTC states that “[a] trust and its terms
must be for the benefit of its beneficiaries.” 245 So far, seventeen
jurisdictions have adopted some version of this rule, 246 and the “benefitthe-beneficiaries” rule is made mandatory under the UTC. 247 While the
application of this provision is still unfolding, it has been suggested that
“it may empower courts to strike down any clause that could reduce the
value of the trust.” 248 For these reasons, David Horton has argued that
“the future of trust law appears to revolve around preserving and
enhancing the value of the corpus, leaving less and less space for
testamentary individualism.” 249
III. ENFORCEABILITY OF POSTMORTEM ARTISTIC CONTROL
We come to the heart of the matter. In some cases, analyzing the
enforceability of postmortem artistic control is straightforward. Taking it
from the top, 250 the ability to dispose of one’s copyrights and tangible
works by choosing one’s successors is, at this point in time, wellaccepted as a legal matter.251 I have argued elsewhere that such a policy
does not in and of itself typically offend dead-hand control
sensibilities. 252 Likewise, the law obviously cannot—and should not—
prevent authors from setting examples through their own artistic
default rules of law,” Cooper, supra note 182, at 2385, the UTC assembled a number of mandatory
“intent-defeating rules that restrict the settlor’s autonomy.” See Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra
note 148, at 1105–06; cf. Ian Ayres, Valuing Modern Contract Scholarship, 112 YALE L.J. 881, 886
(2003) (remarking on the UTC’s marked shift in including an array of mandatory rules).
244. See supra notes 178–83 and accompanying text.
245. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 404; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 27(2) (AM. LAW
INST. 2003) (specifying that a “private trust, its terms, and its administration must be for the benefit
of its beneficiaries”).
246. Horton, supra note 47, at 77 n.116 (setting forth jurisdictions).
247. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(3).
248. Horton, supra note 47, at 77.
249. Id.; see also id. at 65 (“[T]he contours of testamentary freedom have become longer but
thinner: the dead may be able to control their property forever, but they have less actual control over
their property.”).
250. See supra Part I.
251. See supra section I.A. But see generally Desai, supra note 17 (arguing against the
contemporary U.S. policy of postmortem copyrights). It is worth noting that the law on postmortem
rights of publicity is still unfolding. E.g., Mark Bartholomew, A Right Is Born: Celebrity, Property,
and Postmodern Lawmaking, 44 CONN. L. REV. 301, 315–17 (2011); Jennifer E. Rothman, The
Inalienable Right of Publicity, 101 GEO. L.J. 185, 203–04 (2012).
252. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.

11 - Subotnik.docx (Do Not Delete)

3/21/2017 3:09 PM

292

[Vol. 92:253

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

activities or from speaking with future successors or users about the
posthumous exploitation of their works. While difficult moral and
ethical issues surround the question of whether successors should carry
out the wishes of deceased authors in these contexts, 253 they remain just
that: issues to be decided largely without legal ramifications.
But with respect to the legal treatment of will or trust provisions that
purport to wield artistic control, the analysis is different. The question is
whether authors (and, a fortiori, subsequent owners) can validly bind
their fiduciaries with respect to the treatment of literary property. 254 This
question, in turn, raises at least two sets of issues. The first is whether
such instructions ought to be enforceable under state law—the system
primarily charged with administering testamentary intent. The second is
whether, above and beyond enforceability under state law, federal
copyright policy ought to weigh in the balance, if not outright preempt
state law on this front. Answering these questions obviously has great
significance not just for the private parties involved, but also for the
public.
A.

Reasons to Enforce Postmortem Artistic Control

An argument can be made that the ability to control one’s works
during the postmortem portion of the copyright term provides added
inducement for the sort of productivity that is relevant to authors,
namely, with respect to the production of creative works. In particular,
the artistic instructions described above may facilitate the sorts of postdeath projects that provide great inspiration and personal satisfaction to
authors during life. 255 Just as with large charitable donations by the
253. Compare SAX, supra note 19, at 44 (acknowledging the internal conflicts faced by
successors but arguing that absent “special circumstances”—for example, the author left no doubt
about his wishes and was unable to perform the destructive act himself—the “grounds favoring
preservation ought to prevail”), and Bilder, supra note 74, at 329–31 (arguing that, with the passage
of time, such expressed wishes are a poor guarantor of authorial intent), with MILAN KUNDERA,
TESTAMENTS BETRAYED: AN ESSAY IN NINE PARTS 268–69 (Linda Asher trans., 1995)
(“[P]ublishing what the author deleted is the same act of rape as censoring what he decided to
retain.”).
254. For her part, Kate O’Neill suggests that such control is largely permissible:
[T]he writer is in the best position to protect personal interests posthumously, if she chooses to
do so, by selection of and directions to a trusted literary executor or trustee. Nothing prevents
trustees from denying access to materials in their control and avoiding copyright issues
altogether (unless such behavior would constitute mismanagement or possibly waste of the
trust assets). In addition, the trustees may exploit the value of the copyrights in the works.
Provided that the trust grants them the power, they may, if they so choose, license derivative
works to the creators of their choosing and attach whatever contractual controls they negotiate.
O’Neill, supra note 116, at 41.
255. See supra notes 134–40 and accompanying text (describing view of Hirsch).
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wealthy, ensuring that a work of art, music, or literature will be
exploited in just the ways chosen by the author can serve to preserve the
author’s memory or provide a reminder that she was here. 256
Furthermore, an author may have substantial emotional ties to her works
and, as is the case with other property, she may be comforted knowing
that those works will remain protected according to her vision 257 and that
privacy interests contained therein will not be compromised. 258
These possibilities can each be squared with the productivityincentive justification for dead-hand control, which is the most
persuasive justification for some commentators. 259 From that
perspective, courts should be wary of interfering with authorial control
by routinely preferring the ex post desires of the beneficiaries (or society
at large) over the ex ante wishes of authors. 260 As Steven Shavell puts it,
“individuals who desire dead hand control will in fact suffer utility
losses when they are alive, assuming that they anticipate that property
will not be used in the way they want when they are dead.” 261 These
utility losses could, theoretically, translate into less lifetime creativity by
authors, which would be detrimental to society.
Effectuating artistic instructions may also uphold expressiveness and
autonomy/dignity values in and of themselves. 262 In a number of
instances described above, authorial instructions can be characterized, in
David Horton’s phrasing, as “self-regarding. [Decedents] do not just

256. See id.; cf. PAUL K. SAINT-AMOUR, THE COPYWRIGHTS: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
LITERARY IMAGINATION 128 (2003) (“Copyright may or may not contribute to the ‘immortality’ of
an author after death; its more important and preposterous function is to make the author feel
immortal before death.”).
257. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. Plato, of course, equated authoring works to
giving birth to children, which would explain the protective instinct. See PLATO, SYMPOSIUM 56–57
(Alexander Nehamas & Paul Woodruff trans., 1989). See generally M.H. ABRAMS, THE MIRROR
AND THE LAMP: ROMANTIC THEORY AND THE CRITICAL TRADITION (1953) (establishing the
Romantic conception of the artist as creator).
258. Hirsch, supra note 115, at 76.
259. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (describing view of Hirsch and Wang).
260. Kelly, supra note 123, at 1175–76; see also supra notes 169–75 and accompanying text
(describing view of Kelly).
261. SHAVELL, supra note 177, at 68; cf. William A. Drennan, Wills, Trusts, Schadenfreude, and
the Wild, Wacky Right of Publicity: Exploring the Enforceability of Dead-Hand Restrictions, 58
ARK. L. REV. 43, 104 (2005) (“A restriction prohibiting disgraceful uses of the decedent’s
identity . . . . can provide a sense of comfort to the celebrity that after death her heirs will not
disgrace her image or reputation and will take reasonable steps to prevent others from doing so.”).
262. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (describing view of Smolensky); supra notes
141–50 and accompanying text (describing view of Horton).
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provide for their loved ones; they also comment on their lives.” 263 For
example, instructions that a fiduciary is not to authorize derivative
works, allow publication of unfinished works, or permit uses of works in
advertising can bespeak an artist’s views of himself and his own literary
creations. Lior Strahilevitz would even extend these expressive interests
to destructive orders by an author-testator. 264 By enforcing such orders
with respect to one’s unfinished works, he argues, a court can assist an
author like Kafka, who “may wish to send a message to the public that
he is not the type of artist who will tolerate, let alone publish, inferior
works.” 265
This very self-expressiveness is arguably all the more pronounced in
the case of Adam Yauch’s will. The handwritten nature of the
restriction, added to the typed text, certainly suggests that this provision
was of particular importance to Yauch.266 Arguably, these are interests
that should be honored until copyright law no longer permits an author
or his successors to enjoy that degree of control—that is, for seventy
years following his death.
Moreover, effectuating artistic control accords with the view of the
settlor as principal 267 and with certain trends in the law, as discussed
263. Horton, supra note 47, at 107. Horton contrasts this to John Langbein’s preferred
characterization of settlors as “beneficiary-regarding.” Id. at 106–07; see also Langbein, Mandatory
Rules, supra note 148, at 1112 (“Trust law’s deference to the settlor’s direction always presupposes
that the direction is beneficiary-regarding.”); Langbein, Burn the Rembrandt?, supra note 178, at
385 (same).
264. See Strahilevitz, supra note 23, at 833.
265. Id. Strahilevitz advances several other arguments in support of a court’s enforcement of a
destruction directive: that the foreknowledge of enforcement will serve as an ex ante incentive to
authors to undertake “high-risk, high-reward projects”; that, as an economic matter, an author “is in
the best position to determine which of his works should form his artistic legacy”; and finally, that
disregarding the order would amount to compelled speech, with possible First Amendment
implications. Id. at 830–35.
266. New York, it should be noted, is particularly rigid when it comes to adherence to
testamentary formalities, and so, as an initial matter, Yauch’s handwriting on the will raised
questions. Under black letter law, no effect could be given to writing—including attempted
amendments to the text—added after execution of the will. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 32.1(a)(1)(B) (2010) (“No effect shall be given . . . to any matter preceding such signature which was
added subsequently to the execution of the will.”). Any such attempts would simply be disregarded.
For that reason, the drafting attorney testified that Yauch’s handwritten words were inserted prior to
the execution of the will, Attorney Affidavit, In re Will of Yauch, No. 2012/2934 (N.Y. Surr. Ct.
Aug. 8, 2012)—a representation that the probate court accepted, Decree Granting Probate, In re
Will of Yauch, No. 2012/2934 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. Sept. 27, 2012). It is possible, however, that had the
Surrogate’s Court not accepted this proffered explanation, Yauch’s alteration nevertheless would
have been accepted because it was initialed by Yauch and his three witnesses. See N.Y. EST.
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-4.1(a)(1)(B) (2010); In re Will of Litwack, 827 N.Y.S.2d 582, 583–84
(Surr. Ct. 2006).
267. See supra notes 230–31 and accompanying text (describing view of Sitkoff).
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above. 268 The increasing opportunity to dictate property distributions
perpetually, to graft explicit conditions affecting highly personal choices
onto a trust instrument, and to have one’s wishes voluntarily carried out
by a donee even where basic trust requirements have not been met all
seem to indicate an enhanced tolerance by society for dead-hand control.
It is also less costly, from a certain perspective, for fiduciaries to simply
follow the instructions they are given rather than engage in a searching
inquiry about what to do. 269
Furthermore, certain kinds of instructions, such as a thoughtfully
constructed moratorium on access or publication (to protect privacy
interests of the still living) or a direction that certain parties consult with
one another, seem reasonable. At the very least, it is hard to argue that
such light-touch artistic restrictions are capricious or wasteful such that
they should be stricken as socially harmful. 270 Importantly, these sorts of
restrictions do not deny living successors the opportunity to make
decisions about the exploitation of works—or at least not for too long, if
the moratorium is reasonable in length. And without such enforcement,
authors may well destroy works themselves. 271
Milder forms of artistic control also square with the sorts of
instructions that courts typically enforce in this arena. By way of
context, courts in the past did take a dim view of testators’ pet projects
they deemed too eccentric. In a number of cases, decedent authors left
money in trust for the purpose of having a trustee or executor publish
and circulate their writings. For example, in Wilber v. Asbury Park
National Bank & Trust Co., 272 the testator instructed in his will that
$15,000 be expended to type, edit, and distribute his manuscript,
“Random Scientific Notes Seeking the Essentials in Place and Space.”273
The court refused to permit the executor to do so, finding the writings
“irrational, unintelligible, and of no scientific or other value,” and that
their distribution would be “a waste of money.” 274
268. See supra section II.C.1.
269. Cooper, supra note 184, at 1182–83.
270. See discussion infra at notes 292–98 and accompanying text.
271. Cf. Timothy J. Brennan, Copyright, Property, and the Right to Deny, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
675, 706 (1993) (“[T]he threat that copyright would not protect creations from being used in
foreseen but unintended ways could discourage creative effort.”).
272. 59 A.2d 570 (N.J. Ch. 1948), aff’d sub nom. Wilber v. Owens, 65 A.2d 843 (N.J. 1949).
273. Id. at 572.
274. Id. at 578–79. The court did, however, find evidence of a general charitable intent—to
advance education, id. at 583–84—which enabled it to apply the cy pres doctrine and direct the
money, in trust, to Princeton University. Id. at 584–86. In another older case, the court found that a
trust had been created, but it was evidently too put off by the decedent’s works to hold it charitable
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More recently, however, in Rosser v. Prem, 275 a court upheld a
bequest that created a trust for the purpose of publishing the testator’s
book, entitled Linda, which dealt with the death of her daughter from
cancer at a young age. 276 In response to the charge that Linda was
“worthless,” 277 the court held that the purpose of addressing a topic such
as bereavement was acceptable and that the court was not supposed to
“review it as might a critic for The New York Times Book Review.” 278
A final, perhaps surprising, reason to enforce particularized
instructions—from the perspective of society—is that such enforcement
would also logically extend to instructions by authors that their
successors deal liberally with their works. For example, an author might
be particularly inclined to support educational uses of her works. On that
basis, authors could theoretically instruct their fiduciaries to allow all
educational or scholarly uses of their works without payment along the
lines Kurt Vonnegut attempted through his get-out-of-litigation-free
letter. 279 “Here, paradoxically, the dead hand’s clasp can play a
constructive role by refusing to yield to the narrow interests of
subsequent living hands.” 280 If all authorial instructions were deemed
unenforceable, then such instructions would fail too.
B.

Reasons to Deny Postmortem Artistic Control

There are many reasons to put one’s copyright interests into a trust.
Primary among such reasons is the ability to consolidate the strands of a
copyright in one place—and in the hands of a trusted manager—while
still benefiting multiple beneficiaries.281 But conveying one’s wishes to a
trustee (or executor) about how and when to license adaptations, for
example, is a different proposition from creating an enforceable duty in
that regard. There are limits on the duties that one can impose upon a
fiduciary. As John Langbein points out, there is no obligation to transfer
or honorary in nature. See Fidelity Title & Trust Co. v. Clyde, 121 A.2d 625, 629 (Conn. 1956)
(“[A] reading of the article which [the testator] called ‘Prenatal Psychisms and Mystical Pantheism’
is a truly nauseating experience in the field of pornography. The trust is invalid as being contrary to
public policy.”).
275. 449 A.2d 461 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982).
276. Id. at 461–62.
277. Id. at 468–69.
278. Id. at 470–71 (holding the “trust created by [testator’s] will is charitable and capable of
being carried out by the trustee”).
279. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
280. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 128, at 51–52 (emphasis in original).
281. See Tritt, supra note 46, at 172 n.298.
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property using a trust. 282 But a “transferor who chooses to use the trust
form . . . must accept that minimum regime of fiduciary obligation that
defines a trust.” 283 And, as discussed, fiduciary obligations are also
incumbent upon executors. 284
Many of the authorial restrictions outlined above 285 raise the types of
red flags that justify interference with testamentary intent. For example,
prohibitions on publication, on the creation of adaptations, on
advertising uses, or on exploitation within geographic areas, or
instructions requiring the destruction of works, are the sorts of use
restrictions that have the potential to “clog[] alienability” 286 and
“directly impair the value of property,” 287 causing harm to society as a
whole. 288 It is hard to argue that instructions such as these are capricious,
exactly, 289 because authors who specify very particular treatments of
their work are often clear-headed, if passionate, when formulating their
prescriptions. 290 Yet, the ordered destruction of works or total ban on
certain uses bespeaks the type of waste that has prevented courts from
enforcing instructions in other settings. 291
The leading case is Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co., 292 in which the
testator directed her executor to raze her home, sell the land, and transfer
the proceeds to her residuary beneficiaries. 293 Refusing to enforce the
282. Langbein, Burn the Rembrandt?, supra note 178, at 380.
283. Id.; see also id. at 382–83.
284. See supra section I.E.
285. See supra section I.D.
286. See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 128, at 22.
287. See id. at 50.
288. See supra notes 154–57 and accompanying text (describing view of Hirsch and Wang).
Indeed, these sorts of instructions may constitute a counterexample to Hirsch’s separately
articulated claim that bequests for purposes often “enhance the value of property in the testator’s
hands without compromising . . . the efficiency of the use of resources.” Hirsch, supra note 115, at
68.
289. As the Restatement puts it:
A clear line cannot be drawn . . . between objectives that are capricious—or ‘frivolous’ or
‘whimsical’—and those that are not. A purpose is not capricious merely because no living
person benefits directly from its performance, if it satisfies a desire that many (even if not
most) people have with respect to the disposition of their property . . . .
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 47 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2003); cf. Cooper, supra note 184,
at 1169–70; Cooper, supra note 182, at 2397.
290. See, e.g., KUNDERA, supra note 253, at 258 (disputing the notion that “wanting to destroy
one’s own work is a pathological act”).
291. See, e.g., Hirsch, supra note 115, at 83 (“Courts should overturn bequests for purposes when
they tend to the injury of society.”).
292. 524 S.W.2d 210 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
293. Id. at 211.
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provision on public policy grounds, 294 the court noted that this was not a
situation in which the testator had attempted to make a specific, if
idiosyncratic, gift of property; rather, the gift she had apparently wanted
to convey was one of cash. 295 Because the enforcement of the will would
have wreaked harm upon the testator’s neighbors and the public, and
actually would have resulted in fewer funds for her residuary
beneficiaries, the court refused to enforce the terms of the will.296 This
was so even though the court acknowledged that the testator would have
been freer to destroy her home while alive. 297 In short, these restrictions
seemed designed to benefit no one and yet were harmful to all
involved. 298
It is true that other courts have on rare occasion enforced equivalent
destructive instructions. 299 In National City Bank v. Case Western
Reserve University, 300 for example, the court found that the testator’s
instructions to her executors—to raze her house and to sell the land—
were not “repugnant, contrary to public policy, nor capricious” because
they reflected her concerns about the changing nature of her
neighborhood from residential to commercial and her desire to have her
home remain residential. 301 But, rather than actually ordering
compliance with these instructions, the court authorized the executors to
sell the house to an historical society with a restrictive covenant
preventing the house’s use for commercial purposes. 302
Aggressive artistic control measures may also create the problems
associated with investment restrictions. 303 Sentencing a work to remain
exclusively in one medium or prohibiting advertising uses for the
duration of the copyright term prevents fiduciaries from taking

294. Id. at 217.
295. See id. at 212.
296. Id. at 214.
297. See id. at 214–15. The intuition is that the instinct to preserve property while one is alive
normally counteracts such eccentric behavior. Id. at 215; accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS
§ 47 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“Although one may deal capriciously with one’s own property,
self-interest ordinarily restrains such conduct.”).
298. Eyerman, 524 S.W.2d at 217; accord In re Will of Pace, 400 N.Y.S.2d 488, 492–93 (Surr.
Ct. 1977) (invalidating instruction directing trustee to demolish two houses on public policy
grounds).
299. See, e.g., In re Estate of Beck, 676 N.Y.S.2d 838, 841 (Surr. Ct. 1998) (declining to vitiate
testamentary instruction based on “anemic” public policy grounds).
300. 369 N.E.2d 814 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1976).
301. Id. at 818–19.
302. Id. at 819.
303. See supra notes 158–61 and accompanying text (describing view of Hirsch and Wang).
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advantage of remunerative investment opportunities that may present
themselves down the road. Authors, like other testators, draft their
testamentary instructions with imperfect information and in
circumstances that can change after their deaths.304 Artistic restrictions
therefore may also fail to accommodate the need to adjust investment
strategy should the beneficiaries require an influx of funds for problems
that arise after the author’s death, such as health issues. Likewise, a ban
on publication of works that are embodied in a single or limited number
of physical copies runs the risk that valuable manuscripts, notebooks,
and canvases could become inadvertently destroyed, damaged, or lost,
depleting their value to the beneficiaries and society at large. For all of
these reasons, enforcement of such provisions could violate the benefitthe-beneficiaries principle that has gained traction in recent years. 305
As described earlier, the modern portfolio theory basically instructs
that a prudent investor should diversify investments. 306 To the extent that
a fiduciary adheres to the rigid restrictions imposed by an author to keep
works cloistered, that action would seem to violate the spirit, if not the
letter, of the modern portfolio theory. It is true that this requirement is a
default rule that can be overridden with proper drafting. 307 Trustees can,
and should, consider an “asset’s special relationship or special value, if
any, to the purposes of the trust or to one or more of the

304. See supra notes 176–81 and accompanying text (describing view of Langbein).
305. See supra notes 176–81, 245–49 and accompanying text. An issue that may readily present
itself is that such restraints may hamstring successors from paying off any estate tax liability, which
is based upon the author’s gross estate regardless of the artistic restrictions imposed. See Revenue
Act of 1962, 26 U.S.C. § 2033 (2012) (“The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all
property to the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death.”); Goffe, supra
note 7. There has been a robust discussion in the literature on this point with respect to the estate tax
consequences of rights of publicity that successors do not plan to exploit. See, e.g., Joshua C. Tate,
Immortal Fame: Publicity Rights, Taxation, and the Power of Testation, 44 GA. L. REV. 1, 7–9
(2009) (discussing the debate and collecting sources).
306. See supra notes 179–81and accompanying text. A classic case illustrating this principle is In
re Estate of Janes, 681 N.E.2d 332 (N.Y. 1997). In that case, former state senator Rodney Janes was
survived by his seventy-two year old wife. Id. at 334. At his death in 1973, his $3.5 million estate
was heavily invested in Kodak stock. Id. (Janes had represented the Rochester area and therefore
may have attached sentimental, in addition to financial, value to his Kodak holdings. See
DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 43, at 626 n.62.) The stock, consisting of 13,232 shares, had a
date-of-death value of $135 per share, totaling roughly $1.8 million. Janes, 681 N.E.2d at 334. By
1980, with only about 2,000 shares sold, the share price had fallen to approximately $47 and the
remaining shares were worth $530,000. Id. at 335. The New York Court of Appeals held that the
trustees had violated their duty of prudence by failing to diversify the trust holdings. Id. at 338–39.
307. E.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-2.3(a), (b)(3)(C) (2010); UNIF. PRUDENT
INV’R ACT § 1(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1995); accord Cooper, supra note 184, at 1180; Langbein,
Mandatory Rules, supra note 148, at 1112.
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beneficiaries.” 308 Such assets have typically included farmland or a
controlling interest in a family business, 309 but there is no reason why
they could not also include copyright interests. Still, courts are wary of
such purported dispensations, and they will typically not discharge a
trustee from the duty to diversify without explicit authorization to that
effect in the trust instrument. 310 Furthermore, at least according to
Langbein, the benefit-the-beneficiaries principle acts as an outer
boundary on a settlor’s ability to depart from default rules. 311
Perhaps enforcement of aggressive authorial restrictions could
actually be consistent with the benefit-the-beneficiaries principle:
consider a case in which departure from the instruction would produce a
work of such inferiority that it would cause a precipitous decline in the
value of the trust’s other holdings, resulting in financial harm to the
beneficiaries. In general, however, it is hard to imagine such a case. For
example, it is nearly impossible to conjure up a scenario in which the
trustees’ licensing of a movie version of The Catcher in the Rye yielded
less overall value to the beneficiaries than a decision to heed Salinger’s
(possible) wishes to restrict Catcher to book form. 312 At the very least, it
would seem reasonable to let living decision-makers conduct the

308. UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT, § 2(c)(8).
309. See, e.g., In re Trust Created by Inman, 693 N.W.2d 514, 520 (Neb. 2005) (farmland);
Wood v. U.S. Bank, 828 N.E.2d 1072, 1079 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (stock).
310. See, e.g., McGinley v. Bank of Am., 109 P.3d 1146, 1154 (Kan. 2005) (“We . . . hold that
through the express provisions of Article VIII.A, as drafted by [settlor’s] own counsel, she reduced
the Bank’s responsibilities contained in the prudent investor rule . . . .”); Wood, 828 N.E.2d at
1077–78 (deeming a general authorization to “retain any securities in the same form as when
received” insufficient to override the normal duty to diversify).
311. Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 148, at 1112; see also id. at 1114–15 (arguing that
departure from the diversification duty is permissible when the trust is one of several for the
beneficiaries or constitutes a tiny fraction of the funds available to them; in light of tax
consequences; or when trust assets are being held for programmatic purposes rather than for
financial investment). But see Cooper, supra note 184, at 1192 (arguing that the latter distinction is
“artificial”).
312. One counterexample that comes to mind is a counterfactual scenario in which Harper Lee
mandated that her Go Set a Watchman manuscript never be released during her lifetime or following
her death. If her fiduciaries ignored this instruction and published it anyway, it is at least plausible
that the depiction of Atticus Finch espousing racist views in his later years might have reflected
back on the idealistic picture of Atticus in To Kill a Mockingbird (1960) and weakened the demand
for the earlier book. See generally Michiko Kakutani, Review: Harper Lee’s ‘Go Set a Watchman’
Gives Atticus Finch a Dark Side, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/
2015/07/11/books/review-harper-lees-go-set-a-watchman-gives-atticus-finch-a-dark-side.html
[https://perma.cc/BT4Y-LX5D].
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cost/benefit analysis of whether to go ahead with the particular
adaptation. 313
Regulating aggressive artistic instructions can often be squared with
the ex ante approach favored by Daniel Kelly because in many (if not
all) cases, deviation from the author’s instructions could be premised
upon imperfect information, negative externalities, or intergenerational
equity concerns. 314 That is, by prohibiting for long stretches of time uses
of expressive works that the living do not themselves object to, an author
can cause harm to her beneficiaries or members of society.
Intergenerational equity problems may also arise. Consider a case like
that of Thomas Bernhard, who attempted to ban the publication and
performance of his work in Austria. 315 Had his instruction been
enforced, it would have greatly reduced future generations’ access to his
work. This is because, by curtailing the access of those members of
current generations with the greatest likelihood of interest in his work,
his restrictions might have relegated his work to obscurity by the time
the copyright expired. 316 In these respects, despite the legally recognized
importance of postmortem copyright interests, the degree of conflict
between the needs of the living and the dead may be significant. 317
Indeed, these conflicts suggest the legitimacy of intervening not only
when a substantial period of time has passed 318 but even when the
author’s death—and social interest in the work—is fresh.
Trends toward easier modification and termination of trusts are also
relevant here. As mentioned, trusts traditionally could not be amended if
such action would frustrate a material purpose of the settlor, even if all

313. As John Langbein puts it, in the example of the instructions issued by the former IBM
employee, to adhere to those stock retention instructions would not be rational:
It presupposes that a now-deceased former employee of IBM (an immense, publicly-traded
company, which is followed by dozens of professional securities analysts, and which operates
in rapidly changing technology-based fields) possesses material information or insight of
enduring value that the securities markets have mispriced.
Langbein, Burn the Rembrandt?, supra note 178, at 392; cf. Hirsch, supra note 115, at 85
(“Knowledge of society and its culture is what makes bequests for social purposes judicious; and
this too is bound to erode as time wears on. In due course, a bequest for a social purpose may grow
archaic, betraying a sort of moral eccentricity.”).
314. See supra notes 169–75 and 191–92 and accompanying text (describing view of Kelly).
315. See supra notes 101–05 and accompanying text.
316. Cf. Desai, supra note 17, at 264–68 (drawing upon intergenerational equity concerns to
argue against a system of postmortem copyrights); see generally Michael J. Madison, Knowledge
Curation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1957 (2011).
317. See supra notes 163–67 and accompanying text (describing view of Smolensky).
318. See supra notes 163–67 and accompanying text.
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of the beneficiaries consented. 319 More recently, as discussed, 320 there
has been a movement toward greater leeway for change. In some cases,
all the beneficiaries may consent to a modification of the author’s
instructions. In such cases, courts may modify the terms as long as that
action would not be “inconsistent with a material purpose of the
trust.” 321 Admittedly, however, an author’s instruction may well be a
“material” element of the trust and therefore an insurmountable hurdle
under the UTC.
But modification may still be possible. As noted, the Restatement
(Third) of Trusts further loosens the UTC’s approach in allowing a court
to modify if “it determines that the reason(s) for termination or
modification outweigh the material purpose.” 322 This would permit a
court to balance the needs of the living against those of the dead. Even
under the UTC’s approach, modification may still be available.
Specifically, under equitable deviation principles, courts “may modify
the administrative or dispositive terms of a trust . . . if, because of
circumstances not anticipated by the settlor, modification . . . will further
the purposes of the trust.” 323
In many cases, as mentioned, the unanticipated needs of the
beneficiaries to exploit copyrights—or of users to access or make use of
copyrighted works—with freer range may justify an amendment to the
terms of the trust. Furthermore, such adjustment could also “further the
purposes of the trust” 324 if it enhances both the economic returns to the
beneficiaries (whose welfare the author presumably cared greatly about)
and the author’s artistic legacy. The changes should, of course, “be made
in accordance with the settlor’s probable intention” 325 to the greatest
extent possible. So, for example, if it was clear that the author wished to
prohibit all adaptations to other media, but was particularly concerned
about film adaptations, a court could require fiduciaries to be more
searching in the case of a proposed film adaptation.326
319. See supra notes 228–29 and accompanying text.
320. See supra notes 232–43 and accompanying text.
321. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 411(b) (UNIF. LAW. COMM’N 2000).
322. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTs § 65 (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
323. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412(a).
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. In addition, it seems likely that authorial instructions would be characterized as
administrative, rather than dispositive, in nature. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66 cmt. b
(2003). If so, they could also be adjusted under the UTC provision that a “court may modify the
administrative terms of a trust if continuation of the trust on its existing terms would be
impracticable or wasteful or impair the trust’s administration.” UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412(b).
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Federal Copyright Policy Disfavors Such Control

What should tip the balance for courts and fiduciaries faced with
these dilemmas? Gareth Jones, in his classic essay, argued that “[p]ublic
policy is an ‘unruly horse’” and that “courts should hesitate to extend the
boundaries of public policy in order to strike down restraints [in trusts]
which they deem to be offensive.” 327 But public policy guided by federal
copyright policy is a different story. Copyright policy provides a highly
relevant boundary line.
While an in-depth exegesis of the various justifications for federal
copyright policy is beyond the scope of this Article, 328 there are, in brief,
utilitarian, natural rights, and personhood theories. 329 It is generally
agreed, however, that the overall goal of copyright law is to maximize
the storehouse of human knowledge by providing limited exclusive
rights to authors. 330 As will be shown in this section, permitting authors
to dictate the uses of their works from beyond the grave generally runs
counter to that goal. For this reason, federal copyright policy should
weigh against the enforcement of post-death instructions in situations in
which authors seek to bar entire categories of uses of their works and in
which, on balance, enforcement is likely not needed to prevent the
premature destruction of works by an author.
Under a utilitarian approach, it is of course conceivable that
foreknowledge that one can control his or her works after death serves as
an upfront incentive to creation. (Indeed, the very term—life of the
author plus seventy years—might serve as a structural incentive to this
effect. 331) While it is impossible to know how widespread such a
sentiment might be, it is likely to be weak as a driving force given how
few authors, relatively speaking, seek to impose the sorts of restraints
discussed in this Article. In addition, while the proposition that would-be
authors are inspired to create by the prospect of providing for multiple

327. Jones, supra note 208, at 128–29.
328. Such discussion can readily be found elsewhere. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD
A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 37–70 (2003); Justin
Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988); Alfred C. Yen, Restoring
the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517 (1990).
329. E.g., ROBERT BRAUNEIS & ROGER E. SCHECHTER, COPYRIGHT: A CONTEMPORARY
APPROACH 8–13, 20–22 (2012).
330. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the
clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement
of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of
authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’”).
331. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012).
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generations of loved ones is consistent with copyright as an economic
driver, 332 the same cannot be said of the present context. For here,
authors often seek to wield their copyrights not as a potential means to
provide for their successors, but as a tool to control the exploitation of
their works after death—and in some instances, to deprive successors of
monetary returns. Such attempts are not in line with accepted copyright
principles but are more reflective of moral rights, which are distinctly
downplayed in American copyright law. 333
If one does not focus on the point of creation, but rather on the
downstream treatment of works already created, the utilitarian
calculation weighs even more heavily in favor of regulating dead-hand
control—in most cases. Even if one accepts the economic efficiencies
entailed by having one clear right holder owning and managing an
asset, 334 those efficiencies—as they pertain to that right holder—end
when the right holder dies. There is no reason to think that a dead author
is in a better position to track a work’s success in the marketplace and
ensure its place in history than are the living. 335 Anthony Reese has
pointed out, with respect to cultural preservation goals, that
[p]erhaps most importantly, copyright law has promoted the
production and circulation of copies of copyrighted works. . . . It
turns out that distributing a work in multiple copies to a variety
of owners can be one of the best mechanisms to help ensure that
the work will survive into the future. 336
By contrast, an author’s stringent controls on access and use of
copyrighted materials can sound a death knell for a work.
There are, however, utilitarian reasons to enforce some strains of
dead-hand control. Provisions that appear to be aimed at protecting
332. See Subotnik, supra note 17, at 99–103 (arguing that the desire to provide financially for
generations of one’s loved ones is compatible with longstanding intuitions that permeate succession
law more generally).
333. E.g., Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of the
Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 1992–93 (2006); Carl H. Settlemyer III, Note,
Between Thought and Possession: Artists’ “Moral Rights” and Public Access to Creative Works, 81
GEO. L.J. 2291, 2306 (1993). Indeed, the primary exception to this characterization is the Visual
Artists Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012), which does afford certain authors rights to
claim authorship of, and to prevent the intentional distortion or mutilation of, works of visual art.
See id. § 106A(a). However, these moral rights are available only for the life of the author (in the
case of newly created works). Id. § 106A(d)(1).
334. E.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI.
L. REV. 471, 475 (2003).
335. See supra note 313 and accompanying text.
336. R. Anthony Reese, What Copyright Owes the Future, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 287, 296–97
(2012).
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privacy interests, as seen in Willa Cather’s, James Merrill’s, and
Maurice Sendak’s wills (and those of so many others), likely reflect
heartfelt sentiment on the part of the decedent. 337 While copyright law
may not have incentivized the creation of letters or analogous personal
documents, 338 society has an interest in preserving many of these items.
If an author feels uncertain about her ability to protect the privacy
interests of herself or other individuals mentioned therein, she may well
destroy the works rather than take a chance on controlled release. 339
Such permanent destruction can harm cultural preservation goals, 340
even if copyright policy does not formally extend to privacy-protecting
purposes. 341 This is why, as stated at the outset, copyright policy is
consistent with enforcing authorial instructions such as reasonable
moratoria on access or publication—that is, in contexts in which it is
likely that, without such enforcement, authors would destroy their own
works.
Turning to other justifications for copyright, while society accepts an
author’s ability to clamp down on uses of her works during her own
lifetime through the exercise of copyrights, it does so over the grave
reservations of many. But at least with respect to living authors, there are
potentially compensating benefits to ease those reservations. Natural
rights and personhood theories counsel in favor of a large measure of
respect for an author’s wishes because it was, after all, the author herself
who labored on and invested her person into the work. 342 Support for
those theories may in turn encourage more creativity in the first place. 343
Furthermore, there is a plausible basis for extending natural rights and
personhood justifications for copyright to the upholding of an author’s

337. See supra section I.D.
338. See, e.g., Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1117
(1990) (discussing “writings prepared for private motives”).
339. See SAX, supra note 19, at 47; Strahilevitz, supra note 23, at 846, 849; Settlemyer, supra
note 333, at 2293 n.10, 2342 n.229.
340. On these goals, see generally Madison, supra note 316, and Reese, supra note 336.
341. See generally Deidré A. Keller, Copyright to the Rescue: Should Copyright Protect
Privacy?, 20 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1 (2016).
342. A postmodernist critique might, of course, take issue with this description. And, in any
event, fair use remains an outlet regardless of the author’s wishes. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17
U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
343. See generally Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L.
REV. 1745 (2012) (arguing that personhood-regarding aspects of intellectual property law can be
reconciled with utilitarian aspects); cf. Settlemyer, supra note 333, at 2292, 2293 n.10 (arguing that
an author’s right to suppress her work while alive because of privacy concerns advances copyright’s
distributional goals).
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choice of successor. 344 But those justifications are on much shakier
ground when it comes not merely to enforcing a choice of successor but
specifications as to how living successors may exercise their inherited
rights. 345
Additional facets of copyright policy both downplay the notion that
the author occupies a privileged perch with respect to postmortem
decision-making and emphasize the role of the living on that front. First,
the copyright termination provision deprives the author of the right to
select her post-death terminating agents and instead supplies a list of
statutory heirs to perform that function. 346 Because the exercise of
termination rights has the potential to adjust the exploitation and
visibility of the work in the marketplace, the dethroning of the author in
this context is quite remarkable and telling.
Second, the well-recognized “orphan works” problem reflects the
need for more unfettered use by the living. “Works are said to be
‘orphans’ when a prospective user has made a diligent, but unsuccessful,
search to identify and locate the copyright owner.” 347 Describing the
many ways in which orphan works can stymie “important, productive
projects, many of which would be beneficial to our national heritage,”
former Register of Copyrights Marybeth Peters stated the following:
The Copyright Office finds such loss difficult to justify when the
primary rationale behind the prohibition is to protect a copyright
owner who is missing. If there is no copyright owner, there is no
beneficiary of the copyright term and it is an enormous potential
waste. The outcome does not further the objectives of the
copyright system. 348
While congressional action to address the orphan works problem has
yet come to fruition, this statement of policy could be applied to the
problem addressed in this Article. Specifically, when authors place
fundamental uses of copyrighted materials out of reach for any living
344. See Subotnik, supra note 17, at 109–10, 113–16.
345. Cf. Desai, supra note 17, at 244–54 (arguing against natural rights and personhood bases for
system of postmortem copyrights); Kwall, supra note 333, at 2003 (proposing a system of moral
rights “limited to the life of the author”).
346. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 203. This is generally the case unless the author dies without a
spouse, child, or grandchild alive at the vesting period. See id. § 203(a)(2)(D).
347. Pamela Samuelson, Notice Failures Arising from Copyright Duration Rules, 96 B.U. L.
REV. 667, 680 (2016).
348. See, e.g., Promoting the Use of Orphan Works: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the
Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 18, 19–20 (2008)
(prepared
statement
of
Marybeth
Peters,
Register
of
Copyrights),
http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-hearing-3-10-2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9RR-KEF8].
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user following their deaths, they have effectively created a problem akin
to the orphan works problem. They have made a living rights holder
non-locatable by being non-existent. Put another way, they create a oneway system in which rights holders can never license, but only sue. For
that reason, an author’s attempts, while alive, to subject her copyrights to
similarly stringent constraints—such as by transferring them into a
highly inflexible irrevocable trust—should likewise be frowned upon. 349
Federal copyright laws can direct the interpretation of state law
instruments when they run counter to federal policies. In some cases
preemption by the federal statute is explicit. For example, “an agreement
to make a will or to make any future grant” will not constitute a valid
waiver of copyright termination rights. 350 Even where the statute is not
explicit, federal policies play a role. For example, a license by one coowner of copyright that purports to be exclusive will be deemed nonexclusive as to the other co-owners by virtue of federal law unless the
other co-owners have agreed. 351 On the patent side, the Supreme Court
recently affirmed a judge-made rule rendering a contract unenforceable
that provided for the payment of patent royalties following the end of the
patent term. 352 While recognizing the impaired right to freedom of
contract that its rule entailed, 353 the Court upheld a policy view that
“when the patent expires, the patentee’s prerogatives expire too, and the
right to make or use the article, free from all restriction, passes to the
public.” 354
In short, copyright policy should be interpreted to provide that, to the
greatest extent possible, the living make decisions about the fate of
copyrighted works. Importantly, this means that living users should be
able to rely upon fair use no matter what instructions an author has

349. See infra section III.D.4. Of course, if a trust were given flexibility to address unanticipated
circumstances, it could actually serve as a solution to the orphan works problem by consolidating
the copyright interests in one place. See supra note 281 and accompanying text. Many thanks to
Thomas Simmons for emphasizing this latter point.
350. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(5).
351. See, e.g., Corbello v. DeVito, 777 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that a “third party
[licensee]’s right is ‘exclusive’ as to the assigning or licensing co-owner, but not as to the other coowners and their assignees or licensees” unless the co-owners have consented); Davis v. Blige, 505
F.3d 90, 101 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Accordingly, a co-owner cannot unilaterally grant an exclusive
license.”).
352. Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2406 (2015).
353. Id. at 2408.
354. Id. at 2407. It must be acknowledged that in upholding the rule from Brulotte v. Thys Co.,
379 U.S. 29 (1964), the Court’s driving concern in Kimble appeared to be stare decisis rather than
patent policy. See Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2406.
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imposed. 355 It also means that copyright policy should weigh against the
enforcement of post-death instructions in situations where authors seek
to bar entire categories of uses of their works and where, on balance,
enforcement is not likely to be needed to prevent the premature
destruction of work by the author. Under this view, reasonable moratoria
on access or publication, or required consultations by particular parties
as to contemplated uses, would be consistent with copyright policy. By
contrast, the enforcement of total prohibitions on publication, on the
creation of adaptations, on advertising uses, 356 or on exploitation within
geographic areas would not be consistent with federal copyright policy.
Nor would the enforcement of instructions requiring the destruction of
physical works that embody the only copies of the intangible work of
authorship.
D.

Handling Particular Kinds of Instructions

In this final section, I suggest steps for dealing with stringent
authorial instructions—that is, where authors seek to bar entire
categories of uses of their works and where, on balance, enforcement
does not appear needed to protect against the premature destruction of
the work by an author. With respect to the latter consideration, one
would expect that authors would more readily destroy letters and diaries
in the face of anticipated non-enforcement by fiduciaries. By contrast, it
seems less likely that they would destroy manuscripts or unfinished
canvases in such circumstances. 357 While case law development by the
courts will be needed to craft workable operating rules, the framework
offered here should not open the floodgates to expensive litigation. After

355. Kate O’Neill argues that, to the extent J.D. Salinger’s trustees “feel legally or emotionally
obligated to enact Salinger’s preferences” by filing “copyright infringements to suppress works that
are critical or disrespectful of Salinger or his work,” their “fiduciary obligations ought not to trump
a user’s legitimate fair use defense.” O’Neill, supra note 116, at 37. This is almost certainly correct
in view of the supremacy of federal law.
356. One might question whether permitting advertising uses “promote[s] the Progress of Science
and useful Arts,” the goals of the copyright system. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This is a fair point.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to predict the ways in which uses of works contribute to the development
of knowledge and culture. Cf. Eva E. Subotnik, Intent in Fair Use, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 935,
936 (2014) (discussing this leap of faith made by the copyright system). Use in advertising is one
possible way.
357. But see POSNER, supra note 127, at 716 (“[O]ne reason to think [that postmortem artistic
control] should be obeyed is that otherwise authors might destroy their [unpublished] manuscripts
prematurely.”).
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all, it is only the rare breed of author who seeks to exert strong artistic
control after death. 358
1.

Fiduciary Intends to Comply

A fiduciary is a living person, so the concerns driving this Article are
not strictly speaking triggered when an executor or trustee affirmatively
seeks to adhere to an author’s instructions. It should be recalled,
however, that a fiduciary can be prevented from carrying out whimsical
or wasteful commands. 359 As argued above, however, it is probably only
in very unusual cases that authorial instructions could fairly be described
as sufficiently capricious. 360 It is more likely that the allegation would be
waste. In such cases, the fiduciary could be liable for a breach of duty to
the beneficiaries for carrying out the author’s instructions without prior
court authorization. 361
Therefore, if the executor or trustee plans to execute the author’s
instructions, courts should entertain lawsuits by the beneficiaries to
modify the restrictions. Such lawsuits are particularly relevant in the
case of instructions that proscribe uses of works, like adaptive uses or
uses in particular contexts (such as in advertising or in certain
geographical places), or that order the destruction of works embodying
the sole tangible copy of the intangible expressive work. The fiduciary
should then be obligated to demonstrate that the benefits flowing from
adherence to the instructions outweigh the financial harms to the
complaining beneficiaries. 362 One possible way to make this

358. Although, as mentioned in the Introduction, as authors become increasingly sophisticated
about their intellectual property assets, there is reason to suppose that this sort of attempted control
will become more frequent.
359. See, e.g., Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co., 524 S.W.2d 210, 214 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (“To
allow an executor to exercise such power stemming from apparent whim and caprice of the testatrix
contravenes public policy.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 47 cmt. e (AM. LAW
INST. 2003) (noting that, “in a trust that has definite or ascertainable beneficiaries, a provision
intended to allow property to be used for a capricious purpose is to that extent invalid”). The
existence of capricious provisions would therefore not compromise the validity of the entire trust;
rather, just those provisions would be unenforceable. Id.; see also id. § 76 cmt. b(1) (2007).
360. See supra notes 289–91 and accompanying text.
361. Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 148, at 1116–17 (“In the event that the trustee
determines that the direction to retain the asset is not in the interests of the beneficiaries, the trustee
has a duty to resist the direction. If the trustee adheres to the trust term in such circumstances, the
trustee risks liability to the beneficiaries for breach of trust.”).
362. For example, consider once again the counterfactual scenario raised in note 312, supra, in
which Harper Lee mandated that her Go Set a Watchman manuscript never be released during her
lifetime or following her death. If we adjust the example and this time imagine that her fiduciaries
seek to uphold the instruction and refuse publication, they might argue that the depiction of Atticus
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demonstration is to identify at least one beneficiary who steadfastly
wishes to heed the author’s instructions. For, as Eric Rakowski notes, “a
person’s relatives or friends may derive satisfaction from observing his
wishes once he is dead.” 363
2.

Fiduciary Does Not Intend to Comply

If the fiduciary seeks to depart from the author’s instructions—
presumably out of a concern that adhering to the instructions would
result in a breach of his or her duties, 364 or out of a meta-level
appreciation of the social consequences of adherence—the fiduciary
should apply to a court for guidance, and courts should be lenient in
permitting modification. 365 Copyright’s goals are particularly relevant
here because the living legal owner of the interests is being prevented
from exploiting them fully. (These goals should also weigh in the
balance in assessing the fiduciary’s failure to pursue lawsuits against
those who breach the author’s stated wishes.) If the beneficiaries
themselves feel some loyalty to the deceased author’s wishes, that
should be taken into account. 366 The more likely scenario, of course, is
collusion between the fiduciary and the beneficiaries to sidestep the
author’s instructions without the blessing of a court. 367 Advocates for
authors’ rights in this area have voiced this particular concern.368 While
one is sympathetic to the living author who hopes to assemble
stakeholders to stand up for her wishes after her death, this possibility of

Finch espousing racist views would depress the demand for To Kill a Mockingbird and that Go Set a
Watchman should therefore not be released.
363. Rakowski, supra note 152, at 101.
364. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 76 cmt. b(1) (2007) (“Because of this combination of
duties, the fiduciary duties of trusteeship sometimes override or limit the effect of a trustee’s duty to
comply with trust provisions . . . .”); see also id. § 66(2) (2003).
365. Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 148, at 1117 (“Procedurally, the appropriate step
would be for the trustee to petition the court to modify the direction, consistent with the benefit-thebeneficiaries standard.”).
366. Cf. Cohen, supra note 71, at 14 (“Could Kafka’s heirs (assuming a proper will) have
required Brod to burn Kafka’s works immediately after his death, or would Brod’s unequivocal
opinion have sufficed to convince the court that these indeed were an asset whose destruction would
be immoral because of their cultural value (which would be revealed to the entire world only
afterwards)?”).
367. Adam Hirsch has noted this possibility in the context of honorary trusts. See Hirsch, supra
note 115, at 97.
368. See Literary Legacies: Executors, Duty, the Law—and a Proposal, 3 COMPLETE REV. Q.
(Nov. 2002), http://www.complete-review.com/quarterly/vol3/issue4/litlegs.htm [https://perma.cc/
664G-7HTR].
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tacit agreement among the stakeholders may simply be unavoidable as
time passes.
3.

Author Prescribes Liberal Treatment of Works

In contrast to the treatment of restrictive instructions, federal
copyright policy should not put up roadblocks to authors seeking to
dedicate their work to the public domain or to otherwise facilitate public
access to, or use of, it. Accordingly, copyright policy should be viewed
as consistent with attempts by authors to guarantee liberal licensing or
unpaid uses of their works following their deaths. In many instances,
such impulses will likely manifest themselves in the creation of
charitable organizations to carry out these purposes. Maurice Sendak, for
example, made clear in his will that he wanted part of his property to be
operated by his Foundation as a museum and study center and “to be
opened to the general public.” 369 In other cases, however, an author
might try to insist upon such treatment outside of the charitable context,
as did Kurt Vonnegut. 370 Such instructions should generally be
upheld. 371
4.

Author Attempts Equivalent Control During Life

One theme that permeates the case law and literature in this area is
whether the fact of a decedent’s death should matter to the enforceability
of her wishes regarding her property. 372 If a person, while alive, can
destroy her property, why should the law prevent her from doing so after
her death? This line of inquiry applies equally to assessing authorial
control over expressive works.
Nevertheless, this Article proposes that the role of third-party
fiduciaries should be similar whether the author is dead or alive. Imagine
that, for some reason, an author transferred her copyrights into an
irrevocable inter vivos trust (managed by a third-party trustee) with the
same aggressive instructions as those discussed throughout this
Article. 373 In such a case, one might at first take the position that, by
369. Will of Maurice Sendak, at 4–5, ¶ 5.B.1(b) (Feb. 6, 2011).
370. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
371. Cf. Hirsch, supra note 115, at 105 (“Yet another possibility would be to grant standing to
persons who benefit indirectly from a purpose bequest.”).
372. E.g., Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co., 524 S.W.2d 210, 215 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Hirsch,
supra note 115, at 74–75; Jones, supra note 208, at 126; Smolensky, supra note 126, at 787;
Strahilevitz, supra note 23, at 839–41.
373. Such cases are likely to be extremely rare.
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definition, a living author is a living person and so a decision to transfer
copyright assets in this way fully constitutes a decision by the living that
should be upheld. Furthermore, there might be a particularly compelling
case to be made that upholding such a decision respects a living author’s
natural rights and personhood interests in a way that distinguishes this
context from that of a dead author. 374 And yet, analogous and overriding
policy concerns regarding the ability of subsequent rights holders to
account for changed circumstances and to make autonomous decisions
about the works would arise. 375 Courts and fiduciaries should therefore
enjoy equal flexibility in such cases as in postmortem cases.
5.

Subsequent Owner Issues Instructions

The reasoning underpinning this Article’s proposal to loosen the
enforcement of rigid instructions imposed by authors themselves applies
a fortiori to instructions imposed by copyright successors. 376 Whatever
special relationship exists in such circumstances between owner and
asset, 377 that relationship is usually one step removed from the regime
that led to the work’s creation. Accordingly, the costs of enforcement in
such circumstances likely outweigh the benefits.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that, to the extent authors attempt to bind their
successors’ ability to exploit copyright interests (or related tangible
374. See supra note 342 and accompanying text.
375. One possible distinction between this context and the postmortem context exists in
jurisdictions that permit a settlor to revoke an otherwise irrevocable trust as long as all of the
beneficiaries consent. See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-1.9 (2010); UNIF. TRUST
CODE § 411(a) (UNIF. LAW. COMM’N 2000). At least in theory, this ability by the living to take
account of changed circumstances alleviates the principal concerns that animate this Article (and
use of a revocable inter vivos trust would alleviate them entirely because a revocable trust is by its
nature revocable by the living).
376. To the extent that the deceased authors themselves did not prescribe the following treatment,
these might serve as examples. See, e.g., Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257,
1282 (11th Cir. 2001) (Marcus, J., concurring) (describing Margaret Mitchell estate’s objection to
uses of Gone With The Wind that refer to miscegenation or homosexuality); Olufunmilayo B.
Arewa, Copyright on Catfish Row: Musical Borrowing, Porgy and Bess, and Unfair Use, 37
RUTGERS L.J. 277, 325 (2006) (noting that “[t]he George Gershwin Trust closely controls casting of
Porgy and Bess by stipulating that in certain performances, characters in the opera that are black
must be cast with black singers”).
377. Margaret Radin’s very invocation of a “portrait” as a quintessential personhood-infused
object suggests that owners of tangible works subject to copyright may (like the authors of the
underlying copyrighted expression) also have personal stakes in those works. See Radin, supra note
140, at 959; see also Desai, supra note 17, at 254.
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property), such control should largely not be enforced where authors
have proscribed entire categories of uses and where enforcement is not
generally needed to prevent the premature destruction of works by
authors. Trust law principles provide flexibility on this front, and federal
copyright policy should weigh in favor of access to, use of, and
preservation of works for the benefit of the living. Gregory Alexander
perhaps said it best when he linked the difficulties in confronting
coherently these sorts of tensions to “our own ambivalent feelings about
social versus individual control over disposition of property.” 378 In some
ways, this Article has advocated inching toward his “incremental”
proposal that we “enrich legal doctrine by treating no single actor’s
intent as capable of trumping the intentions of all other actors with
respect to the disposition of a given asset.” 379 The treatment of attempted
artistic control after death offers a reasonable place to let the living have
their say.

378. Alexander, supra note 168, at 1263.
379. Id. at 1266.

